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Foreword
In 2012, Latin America and the Caribbean reached an important 
milestone: 30 years since the beginning of the debt crisis that led to the 
region’s “lost decade”. This occasion offers an opportunity to reflect on how 
access to financing has evolved, the lessons learned over the period, and 
the challenges —old and new— that it faces. 
ECLAC has drawn attention to the importance of attaining sustainable 
growth with equality, as well as the need for devising strategies to achieve 
that goal. Obtaining financing for these is of paramount importance. Critical 
in this process is to strengthen the international financial system’s ability to 
prevent and manage crises and improve countries’ access to international 
financial markets. 
This publication, which it is my pleasure to introduce, examines 
how external debt financing has evolved in the past three decades. It looks 
back 30 years and analyses the Latin American and Caribbean region’s 
trajectory from the unique perspective of access to international financial 
markets. As the title implies, this trajectory has been a rollercoaster ride, 
with many ups and downs, and moments of anticipation and panic. Bond 
financing today is very different from what it was in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Access to external bond financing has become more widespread and less 
costly, increasing countries’ options when considering ways to finance 
investment and development strategies. Through its analysis of the forces 
behind the evolution of spreads, issuance and credit ratings, this book tracks 
major changes during the period. By end-2012, debt spreads had declined 
considerably from the high levels prevalent in the late 1990s and early 
2000s; the composition of debt issuance had shifted from sovereigns to the 
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corporate sector and to local markets; debt was being issued on a broader 
range of currencies; credit quality had improved substantially; and Latin 
American and Caribbean external debt was attracting a larger and more 
diversified investor base.
In contrast to the 1980s, in the 1990s Latin America and the Caribbean 
regained access to international capital markets, which, in combination with 
a commitment to robust macroeconomic principles, led to smaller fiscal 
deficits and lower inflation. Sources of external finance other than foreign 
direct investment and official credit were extremely volatile throughout the 
decade, however, reflecting the inherent instability in global financial markets. 
Latin American and Caribbean countries exhibited tremendous 
vulnerability to financial cycles, which were often accompanied by procyclical 
macroeconomic policies. There were shortcomings in the region’s financial 
development process, as well, and the failings of mechanisms for regulating 
and supervising national financial systems paved the way for unusually 
frequent financial crises. As a result, the region did not grow fast enough to 
strengthen labour markets or to reduce poverty significantly and recovered 
only part of the ground it had lost in the 1980s. 
In the 2000s, however, the rate of growth picked up. Economic 
performance became associated less with the magnitude of private capital 
flows and more with export performance. Along with a more cautious fiscal 
stance in most countries of the region, current account surpluses helped 
to bring down foreign debt ratios and reduce external vulnerability. The 
region’s financial development process advanced, access to international 
debt markets increased and financing costs fell. Supported by improved 
economic fundamentals, a commitment to robust macroeconomic principles 
and, most significantly, a greater emphasis on social spending, Latin 
American and Caribbean countries not only grew faster between 2002 and 
2012, but also experienced a sharp decline in unemployment and a rise in 
real wages. Whereas the 1990s were typified by rising inequality, from 2003 
on, a turnaround in the region led to falling poverty and inequality.
The developments of the past three decades as described in this book 
suggest that more widespread and cheaper access to international capital 
markets can play a role in the long process of achieving sustainable growth 
with equality, by broadening the options for financing investment and 
social initiatives. Several countries in the region which had faced a shortage 
of funds in 1982 had moved, by 2012, to a position of learning how best to 
manage available financing options. 
Despite the lessons learned and the progress over this 30-year period, 
many challenges remain. Access to external debt financing is not universal 
and, despite increased resilience, vulnerability to external financial shocks 
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can still be a threat. Moreover, the financial and economic advances of the 
past 30 years, and particularly of the past decade, have not brought about 
changes in the region’s production structure. Structural change should be 
at the heart of a long-term growth process to make equality a reality.
Alicia Bárcena
Executive Secretary
Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

Abstract
This report examines how the access of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries to external debt financing has evolved in the three decades since the 
debt crisis of 1982. In these thirty years, as the global financial environment 
evolved and structural shifts took place in the region, the market for Latin 
American and Caribbean tradable debt opened, deepened and broadened, 
developing from an unsecuritized loan market in the 1980s to a robust and 
improved securitized bond market by the end of the period. 
The study highlights how bond financing today is very different from 
what it was in the 1980s and 1990s and how access to external bond financing 
has become more widespread and less costly. Through the analysis of the 
forces behind the evolution of spreads, issuance and credit ratings, the report 
shows that by the end of 2012, debt spreads had declined considerably from 
the high levels prevalent in the late 1990s and early 2000s; the composition 
of debt issuance had shifted from sovereigns to the corporate sector and 
to local markets; debt was issued on a broader range of currencies; credit 
quality had improved substantially; and Latin American and Caribbean 
external debt attracted a larger and more diversified investor base. 
From 1982 to 2012, several countries in the region moved from facing 
a shortage of funds to learning how best to manage available financing 
options. Access to external debt financing is not universal, however, and 
despite increased resilience, vulnerability to external financial shocks can 
still be a threat.

Introduction
Since the 1982 debt crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean, access to 
international debt markets has developed considerably. In the past three 
decades, the market for Latin American and Caribbean tradable debt has 
opened, deepened and broadened, as the region underwent important structural 
shifts, including long-term changes in economic policies across countries 
and rising global economic weight. Bond financing for the region today is 
thus very different from what it was in the 1980s and 1990s. Important recent 
trends include a shift in public sector funding from sovereign debt to local 
markets and in external funding from sovereign to corporate and bank debt. 
The region has also been gradually rising above some of the financial 
markets’ asymmetries that were so prevalent in the 1990s.1 Countries are 
overcoming the so-called original sin,2 and liabilities have lengthened as 
countries are increasingly able to issue longer-term financial assets. Mexico, 
for example, was able to place a 100-year bond in foreign markets in 2010, 
selling the longest-maturity debt ever issued by a Latin American country. 
The deepening of financial globalization over the past few decades was 
a decisive factor in the volatility and the boom-bust cycles experienced by 
the region in the period. It accentuated the effects of fluctuations stemming 
from changes in the global financial environment and the influence of 
international financial markets on local markets (ECLAC, 2012).
1 For a discussion of these asymmetries, see Ocampo (2001).
2 Original sin is the expression coined by economists Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann and 
Ugo Panizza in a series of papers to describe emerging economies’ inability to issue long-term 
debt at reasonable interest rates in their domestic currency in international capital markets.
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Given the many ups and downs of the past thirty years, Latin American 
and Caribbean debt markets have had quite a rollercoaster ride. The ride 
began shortly after the regional debt crisis in 1982, when an incipient 
secondary market for sovereign debt started to develop among commercial 
banks. The market for Latin American debt has evolved in the past threee 
decades, growing in volume, types of instrument traded and number of 
investors and trade houses involved.
Emerging market debt materialized as an asset class in the 1980s, when 
a small group of traders began to intermediate the transactions between 
sellers and buyers of developing countries’ debt in the aftermath of the 
debt crisis in 1982. Debt trading activity increased throughout the decade. 
In 1989, the Brady Plan was unveiled, further accelerating the growth of the 
region’s debt trading markets. By pushing securitization forward, the plan 
helped countries enhance their access to international financial markets and 
redefine their integration in the global economy. The unsecuritized loan 
market of the 1980s was gradually replaced by a securitized bond market. 
In the 1990s, external financing in Latin America and the Caribbean was 
characterized by increasing access to international bond markets. Investors were 
drawn by the high growth potential and high yields in most countries of the 
region, as well as by a general trend towards the implementation of economic 
and political reforms. As a result, the relative size of the Latin American and 
Caribbean market worldwide grew, and bond financing became the second 
major source of external funding in the region after foreign direct investment. 
The region’s growth became closely associated with the magnitude of 
net private capital flows, however, and a series of external events underscored 
the region’s vulnerability to financial shocks and interruptions to those flows. 
Bond flows to Latin America were highly volatile throughout the decade, and 
they were strongly concentrated in middle-income countries, particularly 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. In addition, bond spreads responded not only 
to economic fundamentals, but also to market sentiment. Issues of financial 
volatility and contagion became particularly relevant to the region, leading 
to much debate about how to cope with the sudden stops3 of international 
credit flows and the financial crashes that follow. 
The wave of financial shocks that started with Mexico’s peso devaluation 
in December 1994 and ended with Argentina’s 2001 default led to real exchange 
rate depreciation in 2001-2002, which boosted export growth. Export growth 
also benefitted from the benign global environment in subsequent years, 
leading to significant current account surpluses in the region.4 Along with a 
3 A sudden stop, or a capital account crisis, can be defined as a large —and largely unexpected— 
fall in capital inflows occurring in conjunction with a sharp rise in credit spreads (see Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Talvi, 2006; Chamon, Manasse and Prati, 2007; Mendoza, 2008).
4 Latin America’s good export performance in those boom years reflects gains in export 
prices, pushed by increases in oil and non-oil commodity prices.
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more prudent fiscal stance in most countries of the region, the current account 
surpluses contributed to a decline in foreign debt ratios, an improvement 
in the region’s creditworthiness and a drop in its external vulnerability. 
Economic performance in the 2000s therefore becomes less associated with 
the magnitude of private capital flows —decoupling, to a certain extent, 
from fluctuations in these flows— and more driven by export performance.
The strong performance of Latin America’s capital markets in the 2000s, 
along with plentiful liquidity in global markets, allowed for record low 
debt spreads, currency diversification (with a particular increase in local 
currency debt issuance), a heightening of the attractiveness of local markets to 
investors, a strong rise in corporate issuance, and a substantial improvement 
in credit quality. 
Bond financing remained the second major source of external funding 
in the region, on average, throughout the 2000s. Its importance actually 
increased in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, with bond 
flows being particularly strong after 2009 (see figure 1).
Figure 1 
Composition oF net private Capital Flows  
in latin ameriCa and the Caribbean
(Annual averages in US$ billions)
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2011
Official creditors
(without IMF)































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF) databases.
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The objective of this document is to examine the evolution of the Latin 
American and Caribbean region’s access to international bond markets in 
the past three decades. To assess the role, performance and evolution of 
bond financing as a source of external funding for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, it is important to understand the behaviour and evolution of 
bond spreads and the changes in debt composition over the past thirty years. 
This study looks first at the early stages of the secondary market for 
sovereign debt following the debt crisis of 1982 (chapter I). It then examines 
the role of the Brady Plan in redefining Latin America’s integration in the 
global economy in the 1990s, as well as the role of debt buybacks and swaps 
that helped bring the Brady bonds full circle in the 2000s (chapter II). The 
following chapters examine the trends in debt trading over the period, 
including changes in debt composition (chapter III), developments in new 
debt issuance, issuer type and currency breakdown (chapter IV), changes in 
the behaviour of spreads, the effects of United States interest rates and the 
correlation between local spreads and United States high-yield corporate 
bond spreads (chapter V), and the evolution of credit ratings (chapter VI). 
Chapter VII takes a closer look at how countries in Central America and the 
Caribbean have fared relative to the rest of the region, particularly following 
the global financial crisis. We conclude with a discussion on how far the 
region’s access to international bond markets has evolved and what is next 
for bond financing in the region (chapter VIII).
Chapter I
The origins of the asset class: 
the debt crisis of the 1980s
In the early 1980s, following three decades of marked economic growth, 
Latin American countries faced a serious crisis associated with the rapid 
increase in their debt with creditor banks in the 1970s and the deterioration 
of the global economic backdrop. Massive and largely unforeseen swings 
in commodity markets, exchange rates, capital flows and interest rates were 
key causes of the 1982 debt crisis. The global recession narrowed export 
markets and squeezed commodity prices, while tight monetary policies in 
industrial countries forced global interest rates up and increased the real 
burden of Latin America’s bloated debt. The crisis hit the region when many 
countries had become used to receiving a high annual inflow of loans and 
had accumulated a very large debt stock relative to previous decades.1 
The resulting decline in capital flows to Latin America throughout 
the 1980s led to a significant shift in the composition of these flows. Most 
notably, official credit from bilateral and multilateral sources increased 
significantly, while the share of commercial bank loans declined quite sharply 
(see figure I.1). Alarmed at the deteriorated quality of their assets in Latin 
America, commercial banks adopted a strategy of reducing their exposure 
in relation to their overall assets as well as their capital, while the increase 
in official flows was partially the result of increased disbursements by the 
1 For a deeper analysis of the 1982 debt crisis in Latin America, see ECLAC (1996), Devlin 
(1989) and Ffrench-Davis (1988).
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World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), both of which 
adopted special programmes to speed credit to recipient countries. However, 
the boost in official flows —augmented by lending from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)— was insufficient to offset movements in private 
markets. The net outflow of capital from Latin America was so great during 
the decade that it seriously impeded new investment and growth.
Figure i.1 
Composition oF net private Capital Flows  












1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
FDI Official creditors
(without IMF)
Bonds Portfolio equity Commercial bank
loans/other
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF) databases.
The spark igniting the developing countries’ debt crisis was the 
announcement by Mexico on 12 August 1982, that it would be unable to meet 
its 16 August obligation to service its debt of US$ 80 billion. The situation 
quickly grew worse, and by October 1983, 27 countries owing US$ 239 billion 
had rescheduled their debt to banks or were in the process of doing so.2 Sixteen 
2 The syndicated bank loans of the 1970s were mostly short- or medium-term loans denominated 
in United States dollars and issued at variable interest rates. The costs of any changes in 
interest rates were to be borne by the borrowing countries, which began to face serious debt 
sustainability problems when real interest rates shot up and the world economy slowed 
down at the end of the decade.
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of these countries were from Latin America and the Caribbean, and the four 
largest (Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico) 
owed various commercial banks US$ 176 billion, or approximately 74% of the 
total debt outstanding. Of that amount, roughly US$ 37 billion was owed to 
the eight largest United States banks and constituted approximately 147% 
of their capital and reserves at the time.3 As a consequence, several of the 
world’s largest banks faced the prospect of major loan defaults and failure, 
putting the stability of the financial system at risk.
The origin of emerging market debt as an asset class goes back to the 
early 1980s and the international background just described. Not long after the 
beginning of the Latin American debt crisis in 1982, a small secondary trading 
market for sovereign loans gradually began to develop among commercial banks. 
The first loan trades took place shortly after the first debt restructurings were 
agreed in December 1982. The trades were initially for the limited purpose of 
allowing lenders to reallocate their portfolio of sovereign credits. Trades were 
structured as exchanges of assets. While major banks continued to hold loan 
assets and to participate in debt restructurings, some smaller commercial banks 
preferred to sell their non-performing portfolios by exchanging their relatively 
small exposure to developing countries. Other banks wished to rearrange their 
credit portfolios by trading loans they had made to one country for another 
bank’s loans to a second country. In 1983 and 1984, a small group of traders 
began to work as intermediaries between sellers and buyers of sovereign loans.4
A. The early years: 1983-1985
The beginning of a secondary market for developing countries’ discounted 
debt was facilitated by four major factors: the willingness of a small but 
growing group of banks to sell their debt at a substantial discount from 
face value; the desire of some banks to adjust their developing countries’ 
loan portfolios through loan swaps; the reduction of the number of loan 
instruments as a result of the debt restructuring and rescheduling process, 
which made the documentation of the swaps simpler, cheaper and quicker; 
and the gradual simplification of debt transfer procedures, which was 
facilitated by the standardization of the transfer provisions in the rescheduled 
loan agreements.5
Only banks with small exposures to the region or large loan loss 
reserves could afford the losses associated with the outright sale of their 
debt. In 1983 and 1984, most banks would not sell their Latin American 
and Caribbean loans outright, but used the incipient secondary market 
to rearrange their portfolios of loans to the region. According to Buckley 
3 See FDIC (1997). 
4 See EMTA (2010) and Wolfson (2010).
5 See Buckley (1997a).
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(1997a), an estimated three out of four debt swaps in this period were purely 
for portfolio adjustment purposes. 
There were four main reasons for a bank to adjust its portfolio. First, 
different banks had different views on the relative creditworthiness of 
different countries and proceeded to readjust their portfolio accordingly. 
Second, many Latin American banks opted to focus their exposure on the 
market they knew best —their own— and proceeded to exchange their loans 
to other countries of the region for loans to their own country. Third, a large 
number of small exposures to borrowers in numerous countries was too 
expensive to manage and administer, and the solution was to focus lending 
to one or two countries. Finally, in the opposite direction, banks also sought 
to diversify risk exposure across a number of countries in the region rather 
than focus their exposure on only one or two countries. 
From 1983 to early 1985, one of the major features of the secondary market 
was that the transactions were customized and individually documented, as 
there were few willing buyers and sellers. Transaction sizes typically were 
not large, and there were no publicly quoted secondary market prices and 
no central location for trading. Another important feature of the secondary 
market in this period was the need for confidentiality, given the politically 
sensitive nature of banks selling their Latin American loans and the capacity 
for these transactions to move the market. 
While the secondary market in this early period played a role in 
affording an exit route for banks with small exposures to developing 
countries’ debt and in allowing portfolio adjustment for the larger banks, 
it offered no relief for the debtor countries and had little impact on the 
amount of debt they owed.
B. Debt-equity conversion schemes: 1986-1987
When provisions allowing creditors to exchange sovereign debt for equity 
or other assets were introduced into new restructuring agreements, the 
incipient trading market gained further impetus. Trading activity increased 
substantially in 1986 and 1987, especially after Chile and Mexico adopted 
debt-for-equity exchange programmes as part of their debt restructuring 
packages.6 
These programmes allowed debt holders to exchange their debt 
claims for equity in state-owned or other companies or for other local 
6 The most heavily traded debt was that of Brazil (before February 1987), Chile and Mexico. 
Towards the end of this period when Chile’s and Mexico’s debt-equity schemes were in 
full swing, these countries’ loans accounted for about two thirds of the total volume of the 
market (Buckley, 1997a).
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assets. Each debt-equity conversion would generate many secondary market 
transactions, resulting in long chains of swaps as traders positioned the 
required amounts of eligible debt with investors. The need to assemble 
debt eligible for conversion into equity thus fuelled a great deal of activity 
in 1986 and 1987. By providing the debt for use in debt-equity swaps and debt 
buy-backs, the secondary market during these years contributed, for the first 
time, to somewhat lessening both the creditors’ and the debtors’ burdens. 
Portfolio adjustment by banks (1983-1985) and debt-equity swaps and 
debt buy-backs (1986-1987) were facilitated by the early secondary trading 
market in its first five years. The incipient secondary market thus played an 
important role in the history and improvement of the debt crisis.
C. Aztec bonds: 1987-1988
In the final days of 1987, a plan for securitizing up to US$ 20 billion of Mexico’s 
loans was announced. The plan consisted of converting loans into bonds, 
known as Aztec bonds, on which the payment of principal was secured. 
The loans eligible for conversion were those held by original creditors, not 
those acquired in the market, so this plan had little impact on the secondary 
market. Nonetheless, this plan is significant as the precursor to the Brady 
Plan, which would transform the market in subsequent years. 
The Aztec bonds were issued to commercial bank creditors in exchange 
for debts owed by the Mexican public sector. Commercial bank creditors 
forgave 30% of the debt in question in exchange for a collateralized, floating-
rate Aztec bond. The Aztec had a tenor of 20 years. Principal would be repaid 
upon maturity and its repayment collateralized by Mexico’s purchase of 
a 20-year zero-coupon United States Treasury bond to be deposited with 
the United States Federal Reserve until maturity. Even though the interest 
rate on these new bonds was higher than on the loans they replaced, the 
reduced principal meant that Mexico would save in net interest payments 
over the life of the bonds. 
In assisting the Aztec scheme by making a special-purpose issue of 
zero-coupon United States Treasury bonds, the United States government 
publicly allowed some degree of debt forgiveness for the first time. This 
departure from the previous “repayment in full” stance was a pivotal step 




The type of voluntary restructuring of non-performing debt, including 
debt relief, that was introduced with the issuance of the Aztec bonds was 
incorporated into a United States government initiative announced by Secretary 
of the Treasury Nicholas Brady in March 1989. The initiative, now known as 
the Brady Plan, called for the United States and multilateral lending agencies 
(including the IMF and the World Bank) to cooperate with commercial bank 
creditors in restructuring and reducing the debt of developing countries that 
were pursuing structural adjustments and economic programmes supported 
by these agencies. Mexico was the first country to reach a Brady agreement 
in September 1989, setting the standard for subsequent Brady operations. 
Many countries that had defaulted on bank loans in the 1980s began 
the 1990s by converting defaulted commercial bank loans to restructured 
sovereign bonds, known as Brady bonds. Brady bonds were the securities that 
ignited the emerging market bond boom in the 1990s and helped redefine Latin 
American and Caribbean bond markets’ integration in the global economy.
In the second half of the 1990s, some countries came full circle, 
voluntarily entering the market to retire collateralized Brady bonds through 
buybacks and swaps for uncollateralized Eurobonds. The attractiveness 
of debt swaps for debtor countries was twofold. First, collateral associated 
with the Brady bonds (low-yield United States Treasuries) was released and 
could be used by the country to meet other obligations. Second, the level of 
debt outstanding was reduced, since the exchange took place at a discount 
based on secondary market prices. For the original holder of the bond, the 
advantage lay in higher yields on the uncollateralized bonds.
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A. The Baker Plan
The Brady Plan was preceded by the Baker Plan. In October 1985, at the 
annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank in Seoul, South Korea, 
United States Treasury Secretary James Baker announced the “Programme 
for Sustained Growth” for the most highly indebted countries, which became 
the core of the United States government’s debt policy for the following 
three years. The plan proposed that the commercial banks would provide 
new loans of US$ 20 billion over the next three years, with US$ 7 billion 
coming from United States banks and US$ 13 billion from banks in other 
countries, while the official agencies, particularly the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank, would provide a further US$ 9 billion. 
The official loans were to be tied to policy reforms in the debtor nations, 
including trade and investment liberalization, tax reform, budget cuts, 
the elimination of government subsidies, large-scale privatization, cuts in 
minimum wages and liberalization of domestic financial markets. However, 
neither the commercial banks nor the official agencies came close to lending 
the targeted amounts of fresh funds.1
By early 1987, the Baker Plan was beginning to unravel as the commercial 
banks increasingly resisted lending new money to debtor countries. The 
resistant institutions were regional banks in the United States and continental 
Europe that had sold their exposures on the secondary markets. The market 
had given them an alternative to new money calls: the liquidation of their 
developing countries’ portfolios. The secondary market thus provided these 
regional banks with a way out of the debt crisis, which the major banks, 
with high exposures, did not have.
By early 1989, the Baker Plan and its strategy of rescheduling with 
new money had become ineffective. Banks were weary of advancing new 
funds and countries were weary of their ever-rising level of indebtedness 
and of the IMF’s austerity programmes. A new approach was needed, and 
it came in the form of the Brady proposal. The Brady Plan, as it became 
known, would in time transform the secondary market.
B. The Brady Plan
The Brady Plan, named after former United States Treasury Secretary 
Nicholas Brady, was introduced in 1989. It represented a sharp departure 
from the Baker Plan. In a speech on 10 March 1989, Secretary Brady proposed 
a series of individual market-based transactions, in which creditors would 
be invited to participate voluntarily. Debt relief would be tied into the 
conversion of loans into collateralized bonds; debtor countries would be 
1 See Buckley (1997a).
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allowed to repurchase their own discounted debt on the secondary market; 
and debt-equity schemes would be promoted. The proposal was seen as 
an expression of increased urgency from the United States government 
regarding the resolution of the debt crisis, a strong call for the development 
of capital-market-based solutions and an official acceptance that some debt 
forgiveness was essential.2 
The Brady Plan combined United States government and official 
multilateral support to obtain debt and debt-service relief from foreign 
commercial bank creditors for those countries that successfully implemented 
comprehensive structural reforms supported by the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. By restructuring its debt, a country could obtain 
partial debt forgiveness while simultaneously deferring a portion of the 
principal and interest payments for a few years, allowing time for reforms 
to ripple through the economy and improve its cash flow and balance of 
payments. Banks were largely given the choice to accept a reduction in debt 
(face value) or debt service (interest rates).
The Mexican Brady agreement, the first to be reached, was the prototype 
for other ensuing Brady-type accords.3 It covered close to US$ 48 billion of 
the face value of Mexico’s eligible foreign debt to commercial banks and took 
nearly a year to develop. In exchange for their illiquid defaulted loans, the 
banks were given three choices of instruments, with two of them including 
an exchange for collateralized bonds. 
The first option was an exchange for discount bonds, or principal 
reduction bonds. These bonds required a 35% reduction in the face value 
of defaulted loans, thereby providing Mexico with debt relief in terms of 
lower principal payments. Discount bonds, however, had a market coupon 
rate of the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) plus 13/16. The second 
option, par bonds, or interest rate reduction bonds, had no face value debt 
reduction, but included a below-market coupon rate of 6.25%, at a time 
when the LIBOR was over 10%. Both types of bonds included full principal 
collateral in the form of a special purpose United States Treasury zero-
coupon bond, similar to the Aztec exchange. They also included a rolling 
interest guarantee (RIG) covering 18 months worth of interest payments.4 
The third option, new money, involved no reduction in the face value of the 
defaulted loans (allowing the banks to carry the full principal amount of 
2 See Buckley (1997b).
3 Mexico’s Brady agreement represented a departure from Secretary Brady’s proposals, however, 
as it was a one-off scheme in which creditor participation was effectively compulsory.
4 The acquisition of the collateral for these bonds —the zero-coupon bonds and the rolling 
interest guarantee— was funded as follows: US$ 1.3 billion from Mexico, US$ 2.0 billion 
from Japan and US$ 3.7 billion from the IMF and the World Bank. See Buckley (1997b, 
p. 1,810). For a description of what a rolling interest guarantee entailed, see box II.1.
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their Mexican loans on their books), but required that commercial banks 
provided additional new lending of at least 25% of their exposure over a 
three-year period.5 
An essential element of the Mexican Brady agreement was the 
emphasis on debt reduction and interest relief. The secondary market 
played a major role to make them more acceptable. The debt of developing 
countries was already being routinely traded at large discounts to par value 
on the secondary market, giving Mexico a fundamental basis for arguing 
that banks were already assuming an eventual write-down on the debt 
and that Mexico should thus be allowed to capture part of the discount.6 
Other agreements soon followed the Mexican Brady exchange. 
By 1996, ten Latin American and Caribbean countries had implemented 
Brady-style exchanges (see table II.1). Over time Brady exchanges became 
more complex, offering a broader array of possibilities for debt and 
debt-service reduction (see box II.1). In exchange for their loans, lenders 
received bonds with terms prescribed by a variety of options, carefully 
developed on a case-by-case basis.
Each completed Brady restructuring resulted in the issuance of new 
debt securities (bonds), which were designed to be more easily tradable 
than defaulted loans. The transformation from an unsecuritized loan 
market to a bond market was finalized in 1998, when all major Brady 
restructurings had been completed. Securitization helped Latin American 
countries enhance their access to international financial markets. 
The majority of Brady debt was issued by Latin America, with 
Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico 
accounting for three-fourths of the original outstanding amounts in the 
market (see table II.2). Almost all countries with defaulted commercial bank 
debt from the 1980s exchanged that debt for Brady bonds or restructured 
loans. Most countries improved their financing budgets throughout 
the 1990s and subsequently raised funds in the Eurobond market. 
5 See Brauer and Chen (2000).
6 See Buckley (1997b).
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table ii.1 
brady agreements with CommerCial banks  
in latin ameriCa and the Caribbean
Country date of agreement debt forgiveness (percentages)
mexico march-1990 35
Costa rica may-1990 n.a.








Source: Jane Sachar Brauer and Douglas Chen, “Brady Bonds”, The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities, 
Frank J. Fabozzi (ed.), New York, McGraw Hill, 2000.
table ii.2 











of all brady 
bonds
latin america and  
the Caribbean 55.77 27.03 65.17 147.96 87.10
argentina 12.67 4.32 8.47 25.45 14.98
brazil 10.49 7.29 32.88 50.66 29.82
Costa rica n.a. n.a. 0.59 0.59 0.35
dominican republic n.a. 0.33 0.19 0.52 0.31
ecuador 1.91 1.44 2.78 6.13 3.61
mexico 22.40 11.77 2.73 36.90 21.72
panama 0.26 0.04 2.92 3.22 1.90
peru 0.18 0.57 4.12 4.87 2.87
Uruguay 0.53 n.a. 0.54 1.07 0.63
venezuela (bolivarian 
republic of) 7.33 1.27 9.95 18.55 10.92
other regions 5.57 5.09 11.26 21.91 12.90
total 61.34 32.12 76.43 169.97 100.00
percentages 36.11 18.91 44.99 100.00
Source: Jane Sachar Brauer and Douglas Chen, “Brady Bonds”, The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities, 
Frank J. Fabozzi (ed.), New York, McGraw Hill, 2000.
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box ii.1 
strUCtUre and types oF brady bonds
Brady bonds were government obligations issued by a debtor country after 
it negotiated with its creditor banks to restructure loans that were no longer 
performing. The creditor banks exchanged the non-performing syndicated 
bank loans for various Brady bonds offered by the debtor government. At 
the conclusion of these negotiations, the creditor banks were given various 
Brady bond structures from which to choose. Once issued, the Brady bonds 
began trading in the secondary market.
Brady bonds were structured in a variety of ways. Early Brady agreements 
included a fixed- and floating-rate bond, with principal collateralized by United 
States Treasury zero-coupon bonds and cash collateral representing a set 
number of future interest payments (rolling interest guarantee). Later Brady 
agreements included a wider array of bond options and structures, including 
fixed-rate, floating-rate, and step-up coupons, bullet or amortizing principal, 
and collateralized and non-collateralized principal and interest payments. 
Not all types of Brady bonds were collateralized, and no Brady bond was 
guaranteed by the United States government.
Collateralized principal bonds: Two principal bonds, pars and discounts, 
were 25– to 30-year registered bullet bonds (meaning that payment of the entire 
principal was due at the end of the term) and represented the largest, most 
common assets in the Brady bond market. Par bonds were issued at par value 
in exchange for the original face value of the rescheduled loans, but they carried 
a fixed, below-market interest rate. Discount bonds carried a floating interest 
rate, typically the LIBOR plus 13/16, but they were exchanged for fewer bonds 
than the original loan amount or at a discounted face value of the previously 
rescheduled loan, often ranging between 50% and 65% of the original face value.
Pars and discounts generally had principal secured by United States 
Treasury zero-coupon bonds, which were originally funded by a combination 
of IMF and World Bank loans and the country’s own reserves. In addition, 
the interest portion of the pars and discounts was partially collateralized by 
securities rated at least AA in amounts sufficient to cover a specified number of 
months (usually 12 months) of interest on the outstanding principal at a notional 
rate. The interest guarantee was characterized as a rolling interest guarantee 
(RIG) because the guarantee rolled forward to the subsequent interest period 
if not utilized. Both the interest and principal collateral were maintained by 
an assigned collateral agent and held in escrow at the United States Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. Bondholders did not have recourse to the principal 
collateral until maturity, at which time the proceeds would be available to 
pay the full principal amount due. Although the earlier exchanges involved a 
special-purpose issue of a zero-coupon bond by the United States Treasury, 
subsequent issues allowed the sovereign to buy United States Treasury strips 
from the growing open market.
Non-collateralized Brady bonds: The types of bonds included in a given 
plan were determined during the debt restructuring negotiations between a 
consortium of creditors and the debtor country. The bonds often had varying 
coupon schedules and amortization scheme, and they sometimes included 
the capitalization of interest. Each plan might also include principal types 
other than par and discount bonds, such as debt conversion bonds (DCB), 
front-loaded interest reduction bonds (FLIRB), and the related new money 
bonds (NMBs). The DCBs, FLIRBs and NMBs were typically non-collateralized 
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amortizing bearer instruments with a significantly shorter final maturity and 
average life than the pars and discounts.
A creditor selecting the DCB option would receive an even par amount 
of bonds, but would also lend the debtor new cash. The debtor country then 
issued an NMB to represent this additional obligation. Interest and principal 
were not collateralized. The FLIRB option provided the issuer with below-
market interest relief in its early years, followed by market interest rates in 
later years. Creditors choosing this option received even par amounts for 
exchanged debt. Interest was collateralized only for a certain period of time, 
and the coupon would first step up and then float.
Capitalization or C-bonds first appeared in the 1994 Brazil Brady plan. The 
C-bond was issued at par value for exchanged debt. The coupon was fixed, 
partly paid in cash and partly added to the principal (capitalized). Bondholders 
accepted more bonds in place of cash for part of the coupon through the 
end of 1999. In the C-bond exchange agreement, Brazil agreed to an 8% 
interest accrual rate that initially only paid 4%. The remaining 4% capitalized, 
increasing the par amount outstanding at the end of the first year to 104% of 
the original amount.
Past-due interest on several Brady plans was consolidated into past-due 
interest (PDI), interest due and unpaid bonds (IDUs), eligible interest bonds 
(EIs), interest arrears bonds (IAB) and floating-rate past-due interest bonds 
(FRB). These instruments were issued in exchange for interest arrearages. 
They showed floating coupons (or step-up coupons in the case of the IABs 
and PDIs). Principal and interest were not collateralized, and principal payment 
could be amortized after a grace period. They generally consisted of a non-
collateralized, 10- or 20-year amortizing floating-rate bond. Past-due interest 
on defaulted loans exchanged for these instruments typically capitalized during 
several of the earlier interest payment periods and then amortized, as was the 
case in the PDIs issued under Brady exchanges for Ecuador, Panama and Peru.
Many Brady deals also included value recovery rights (VRRs). Payments 
on VRRs were contingent on favourable conditions for the debtor countries. 
For example, in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Mexico, VRRs 
were contingent on the international price of oil (in the case of Mexico, on a 
combination of price and export volumes). Other VRRs were contingent on 
either the growth rate or the level of GDP reaching a certain value. The general 
principle was that if the debtor country’s economic conditions improved, 
creditors could also benefit from these improvements by receiving additional 
payments. Although VRRs became a marginal part of the emerging market 
debt, they provided valuable lessons on how to create and trade contingent 
debt instruments. One lesson was a preference for simplicity, as market interest 
would decline when the formula to determine the payoff was unnecessarily 
complicated. Another lesson was the need for convenience: market interest 
would rise when the VRRs were made detachable from the main bond with 
which they were associated, so they could be traded as separate financial 
instruments. This was the case with Mexico’s VRRs.
Source: Jane Sachar Brauer and Douglas Chen, “Brady Bonds”, The Handbook of 
Fixed Income Securities, Frank J. Fabozzi (ed.), New York, McGraw Hill, 2000; Sharon 
Y. Lee and Michael E. Venezia, “A primer on Brady Bonds”, United States Fixed-Income 
Research, Emerging Markets Fixed Income, Salomon Smith Barney, 9 March 2000 and 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), “Living with debt. How to limit the risks of 
sovereign finance”, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 2007 Report, 
Eduardo Borensztein, Eduardo Levy Yeyati and Ugo Panizza (cords.), 2007.
box ii.1 (concluded)
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C. Buybacks and swaps
In the second half of the 1990s, some countries came full circle, voluntarily 
entering the market to retire collateralized Brady bonds through buybacks 
and swaps for uncollateralized instruments (see box II.2). These buybacks 
and swaps enabled the debtor country to release the collateral associated 
with the Brady bonds (low-yield United States Treasuries) in order to use it 
to meet other obligations, as well as to reduce the level of debt outstanding, 
since the exchange would take place at a discount based on secondary 
market prices. For the original holder of the bond, the advantage was on 
the uncollateralized bonds’ higher yields.
box ii.2 
retiring brady bonds
Within 10 years of the creation of the last Brady bond, sovereign issuers 
had retired virtually all Brady bonds through several main approaches: 
•	 Quietly buying back Brady bonds in the secondary market;
•	 Initiating a formal Brady to Eurobond exchange programme, in which 
the exchange price was preset and bids were solicited (for example, 
Mexico in 1996, followed by subsequent formal exchanges by Argentina, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Panama and Uruguay); 
•	 Initiating a formal exchange into local debt, with a commitment to pay 
the debt service from tax revenues;
•	 Engaging in private exchange agreements; 
•	 Using Brady bonds as payment in privatizations (for example, Brazil); 
•	 Bonds maturing; and
•	 Exercising the call option on the bond, since all but one Brady bond 
were callable at par. 
Source: Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, “Sovereign debt restructurings: lessons from 
Brady bonds”, GEMs Strategy Viewpoint, 3 February, 2011.
The cycle of debt buybacks and swaps started with Mexico in 1996, 
which undertook two operations to retire US$ 3.6 billion of Brady bonds. 
In 1997, Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and 
Panama followed suit, retiring US$ 10.4 billion of collateralized Brady bonds 
through debt buybacks and discounted swaps for unsecured bonds. In 1998, 
Argentina undertook two straight buyback operations, retiring US$ 1.5 billion 
of Brady bonds. In 1999, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay retired 
US$ 6 billion. Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Mexico 
were the largest buyers of their own Brady bonds in Latin America in the 
second half of the 1990s, retiring over 30% of their original issue of Brady debt. 
The buybacks and swaps continued in the 2000s. Mexico retired all 
its outstanding Brady debt in 2003, the first country to do so. Argentina and 
Ecuador retired most of their outstanding Brady debt through the restructuring 
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process that took place after their default, as did Uruguay through its debt 
restructuring (see box II.3). In July 2005, Brazil announced the retirement 
of US$ 4.4 billion of its C-bonds (capitalization bonds).7 The C-bonds were 
exchanged for new A-bonds (amortization bonds), and with this exchange 
Brazil further reduced its amount of outstanding Brady debt. Then, in 
March 2006, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Brazil announced 
the retirement of all their outstanding Brady debt, while Panama retired 
the last of its outstanding Brady debt in July, bringing the asset class that 
was created from the 1980s-era defaulted bank loans to a virtual extinction. 
box ii.3 
eCUador, argentina and UrUgUay: restrUCtUrings 
oF brady debt
Ecuador (1999): Ecuador was the first country to default on Brady bonds. 
Ecuador’s debt was more diverse than some at the time of default in 1999, 
with six Brady and Eurobond issues totaling US$ 7.7 billion in face value. 
There were two global bonds: the 2002 global, an extremely illiquid global 
bond issued in 1997 and primarily held by banks, and another global bond 
that never traded. Ecuador defaulted in 1999 and restructured in 2000. In 
the 2000 restructuring, the two global bonds received preferential treatment. a
Argentina (2001): The government conducted two large voluntary exchanges 
of debt in an effort to reduce near-term debt service by extending maturities 
and lowering cash coupon rates, but these were not sufficient to avert default. 
First, the government carried out a “mega swap” in June 2001, exchanging 
close to US$ 30 billion of local, external global and external Brady debt, 
much of it coming due in the near future. Credit rating agencies viewed the 
exchange as taking place at fair market levels. Second, in November of the 
same year, the government offered another exchange of Brady and Eurobond 
debt for local loans. The November exchange was viewed as coercive by S&P, 
however, who downgraded all eligible bonds to a default rating of D. Within a 
month, the sovereign declared a moratorium on the payment of US$ 95 billion 
of external debt, the largest sovereign default in history. b 
Uruguay (2003): When Argentina defaulted at the end of 2001, Uruguay’s 
cost of funds was T+300 basis points. Four months later, it was T+500 basis 
points and rising. By August 2002, there was a run on the banks, the government 
froze some deposits, and bonds had plummeted. Uruguay’s banking system 
was heavily dollarized, and neither the banks nor the government held enough 
liquid dollar assets to back these deposits. Banks were not able to open until 
the United States pledged US$ 1.5 billion to bolster Uruguay’s financial system. 
The International Monetary Fund had pledged US$ 2.8 billion in assistance 
the year prior and had asked Uruguay to propose an exchange before failing 
to make a payment on its debt (pre-default), to try to avoid the type of crisis 
that took place in Argentina. To succeed in this preemptive strategy, Uruguay 
aimed for a voluntary exchange that would treat bondholders equally, pursuing a 
market-friendly approach that included informal consultations with bondholders. 
7 The C-bond had been a benchmark for many years, accounting for around 10% of all 
emerging market debt trading in the 10 years up to 2003. However, it lost its liquidity after 
that date, as the 2040 bond (a global bond) grew in importance.
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The exchange was successful. It gave Uruguay a fiscal surplus and enabled 
it to draw on IMF loans and to regain investor confidence in its ability to pay 
debts and revive the economy. Collective action clauses (CAC) were included 
in the new bonds issued in the Uruguayan exchange. c
Source: Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, “Sovereign debt restructurings: lessons from Brady 
bonds”, GEMs Strategy Viewpoint, 3 February, 2011, and “Sovereign debt restructurings, 
Part 2: post-Brady experience”, GEMs Strategy Viewpoint, 18 March 2011.
a At the end of 2008, Ecuador defaulted on its foreign debt again, which this time 
involved global bonds only. It conducted another restructuring post-default, buying 
back the defaulted 2012 and 2030 bonds at 35 cents on the dollar in 2009.
b Three years later, Argentina launched another debt exchange offer to swap its 
defaulted debt for new bonds with a total value of US$ 41.8 billion: on 3 March 2005 
the government announced that 76% of its creditors (97% in Argentina and 65% 
abroad) had accepted this offer. This was the biggest discount ever proposed by a 
defaulted country to its creditors. Under the offer, Argentina would pay 30 cents -34 
cents on each dollar in net present value terms. In 2010, Argentina opened another 
bond exchange, which added a further US$ 20 billion in participation, for a total 
participation rate of 92% of total defaulted debt.
c Other countries subsequently adopted a similar preemptive approach, proposing debt 
exchanges before missing payments on their debts: Grenada in 2004, the Dominican 
Republic in 2005 and Belize in 2006.
The Eurobonds and global bonds issued in the 1990s started to 
displace the original Brady bonds and eventually became dominant in the 
markets.8 In fact, sovereigns preferred to replace their Brady bonds with other 
instruments because the origins of the Brady bonds in the restructuring of 
defaulted bank loans were a reminder of a troubled past. In addition, the 
structure of the Brady bonds was more complicated. 
Eurobonds are typically plain vanilla bullet structures,9 and investors 
tended to see them as less subject to default risk than the Brady bonds. 
Investors did not require as wide of a spread on Eurobonds as on Brady 
bonds. With tighter Eurobond spreads, sovereigns were able to reduce their 
external funding cost by occasionally using the proceeds from Eurobond 
issues to retire outstanding Brady debt.10 The Brady bonds that were retired 
typically had higher spreads and lower absolute prices than the Eurobonds 
that replaced them, thereby offering the sovereign net present value (NPV) 
savings and a reduction in the stock of debt (face value).11 
According to IDB (2007), a total global volume of US$ 175 billion in 
Brady bonds was issued.12 Of that total, just over US$ 10 billion remained 
8 A Eurobond is a bond that is issued and sold to international investors and is not subject 
to registration. A global bond is a bond that is registered in the jurisdiction of the major 
financial centres (see Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2011)). Despite the distinction, global 
bonds are also referred to as Eurobonds, and are frequently included in the same category.
9 Bullet structures mean that the principal is paid in full in a single payment at the end of 
the bond’s maturity term (rather than being amortized, or gradually paid back, over the 
specified term of the bond). 
10 See Brauer and Chen (2000).
11 See Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2011).
12 This total differs from that found in Brauer and Chen (2000), according to whom the total 
amount of Brady bonds issued was slightly lower —US$ 170 billion— as shown in table II.2.
box ii.3 (concluded)
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in circulation by 2006 and more than 97% of the region’s Brady debt had 
already been retired (see table II.3). 
The buyback operations or exchanges of Brady debt led to a sharp 
fall in its share of outstanding external sovereign debt in the 2000s. Now 
the once-dominant debt instrument is a dying asset class. After reaching a 
peak in March 1997, the stock of dollar-denominated Brady bonds embarked 
on a downward trend (see figure II.1). This trend was largely a result of two 
factors: plentiful liquidity in world financial markets, which encouraged 
investors to seek higher yields available on riskier assets such as emerging 
market bonds, and a sharp improvement in the creditworthiness of many 
emerging market countries. 
Most of the retirements were possible because the countries with Brady 
agreements had regained the confidence of investors and of international markets 
after restructuring their debts. The retirement of Brady bonds is a sign of the 
strength of the sovereign bond market, which grew to significant proportions in 
global capital markets. The recovery of these countries was so remarkable that 
just a few years after the last Brady was retired, countries that had accounted 
for over 50% of the Brady debt had already become investment grade. 
table ii.3 
original amoUnts and oUtstanding balanCes 
oF brady bonds as oF marCh 2006
(US$ billions)
issued outstanding (march 2006)











latin america and 
the Caribbean 143.1 81.8 3.9 36.4 97.3
argentina 1993 24.8 14.2 0.0 0.0 100.0
brazil 1994 51.3 29.3 0.0 0.0 100.0
Costa rica 1990 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 100.0
dominican republic 1994 0.5 0.3 0.4 3.7 20.0
ecuador 1995 6.3 3.6 0.0 0.0 100.0
mexico 1990 35.6 20.4 0.0 0.0 100.0
panama 1996 2.9 1.7 0.9 8.4 69.0a
peru 1996 4.2 2.4 2.0 18.7 52.4b
Uruguay 1991 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 100.0
venezuela (bolivarian 
republic of) 1990 15.8 9.0 0.6 5.6 96.2
other countries 31.8 18.2 6.8 63.6 78.7
total 174.9 100.0 10.7 100.0 93.9
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), “Living with debt. How to limit the risks of sovereign 
finance”, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 2007 Report, Eduardo Borensztein, Eduardo 
Levy Yeyati and Ugo Panizza (cords.), 2007.
a Panama retired the last of its outstanding Brady debt in July 2006.
b Peru retired the bulk of its outstanding Brady debt in March 2007 and by March 2008 had retired nearly 
all of its Brady debt.
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Figure ii.1 
the deCline oF brady debt 








































Eurobonds and global bonds Brady
Source: Emerging Markets Trade Association (EMTA).
Chapter III
Emerging market tradable debt: 
the maturing of the asset class 
In the past three decades, emerging market debt as an asset class has evolved 
and matured. The asset class is broader today, credit quality has improved, 
and the investor base has expanded. Following the implementation of 
the Brady agreements, emerging market trading experienced a profound 
transformation, from a market for trading commercial loans to a broadening 
market for securities and related derivatives. 
As emerging market debt transitioned from mostly loans to bonds 
(first to Brady bonds and then to Eurobonds and global bonds), the creditor 
base broadened from commercial banks to other institutional investors. 
Nevertheless, investment and trading opportunities throughout the emerging 
markets continued to share certain characteristics that presented common 
risks. According to Chamberlin (2010), “in addition to the customary risks 
stemming from the issuer’s economic or financial performance and its 
capacity to service its payment obligations, these common risks included 
a variety of cross-border risks such as legal and regulatory uncertainties, 
enforcement difficulties, foreign exchange fluctuations and restrictions and 
changes in government or government policies, including the risk that a 
country’s willingness might fall short of its capacity to honour its debt.” 
These risks and the volatility associated with them, together with weaknesses 
in trading infrastructure, kept the asset class separated from mainstream 
trading and investment. For much of the 1990s, emerging market economies 
experienced boom-bust cycles as a result, facing a series of financial crises 
that underscored the vulnerability of the asset class to external shocks. 
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Emerging market debt as an asset class has improved since the 
crises of the 1990s. During the 2000s, supported by economic policies that 
brought about macroeconomic stability and a higher participation in the 
global economy, emerging markets in general and Latin America’s capital 
markets in particular performed strongly, allowing the asset class to evolve 
and mature. 
Emerging markets were the main contributors to global growth in 2012. 
In addition, many emerging market countries have moved to net external 
creditor status. In Latin America, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru have become net creditors. This contrasts 
sharply with the surge in public indebtedness in advanced economies. 
As a result, local emerging markets became increasingly attractive to 
investors in the last decade, and corporate issuance grew strongly. The 
most recent trends point to a shift in public-sector funding from sovereign 
external debt to local markets and in external funding from sovereigns to 
corporates and banks. 
In this section, we examine the evolution of emerging market debt as 
an asset class, with a particular focus on Latin America and the Caribbean. 
A. Evolution of the asset class: 1990s to 2000s 
Since the crises of the 1990s, emerging market debt as an asset class has 
improved. Unlike previous shocks, Argentina’s 2001 default, which occurred 
towards the end of the cycle of financial shocks in the 1990s, produced 
virtually no contagion to the broader emerging market debt asset class. The 
lack of contagion demonstrated fundamental improvements, with respect 
to both assets and investors. The improvements continued throughout 
the 2000s and can be summarized as follows: 
• The asset class is broader today. For example, when the tequila 
crisis hit Mexico in December 1994, the JP Morgan EMBI Global 
index contained just 15 countries (seven of which were in 
Latin America and the Caribbean), but by the end of 2012 it 
contained 55 countries (including seventeen from the region). 
This means that investors have more options if one or more of 
the countries face problems. 
• Credit quality in emerging markets has improved, which is 
reflected in improved credit ratings. There has also been an 
improvement in instrument quality. In the 1990s, many of 
the instruments in the JP Morgan EMBI indices were loans 
or collateralized Brady bonds. Since the completion of Brady 
restructurings in the 1990s, most borrowers have bought back 
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collateralized bonds and paid down restructured bonds. Many 
of the buybacks took the form of a debt exchange, in which 
the issuer saved money by buying cheap collateralized debt 
and issuing more expensive global bonds. The substitution of 
Brady bonds with global bonds has improved the quality of the 
instruments that make up the asset class. 
• The emerging market investor base has also improved since 
the crises of the 1990s. Prior to Russia’s 1998 default, emerging 
market debt was dominated by highly leveraged investors, such 
as banks and hedge funds, which were short-term traders. Today 
the investor base has more investors willing to buy and hold the 
assets for the long term. The fundamental trend since 2002 has 
been for emerging market debt to flow out of the hands of 
short-term investors and into the hands of long-term investors. 
Moreover, the investor base is broader, including investment 
grade managers (as many emerging market countries have 
been upgraded to investment grade) and local pension funds.
On average, the total global emerging market (GEM) debt stock has 
grown approximately 16% per year since 2002 and 14% per year since 1994, 
according to Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, on the basis of data from 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The total outstanding stock 
of emerging market tradable debt reached a new high of US$ 14 trillion 
in 2012.1 Global emerging market external debt was 8.3% of world external 
debt, and outstanding GEM domestic debt was 13.2% of world domestic debt 
in 2012 as reported by the BIS, making GEM tradable debt an important 
part of the global bond universe. 
B. Emerging market debt universe
According to Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, total outstanding emerging 
market tradable debt reached a new high of US$ 14 trillion in 2012 from only 
US$ 2.5 trillion in 2000, a total that includes domestic and external tradable 
debt. For Latin America and the Caribbean, total outstanding tradable debt 
stood at US$ 3.7 trillion in 2012, accounting for 26% of the overall total for 
global emerging market debt. 
1 See Bank of America/Merrill Lynch (2013). Total outstanding global emerging market 
tradable debt also includes tradable loans, local/regional government tradable debt, 
treasury bills, central bank bills and other short-term debt. 
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Figure iii.1 
total oUtstanding global emerging market and latin ameriCan  







































Total Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Bank of America/Merrill Lynch Global Research, Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for the largest share of 
total global emerging market external tradable debt throughout the 1990s. 
Although the region also maintained the largest share in the first half of the 
2000s, the trend turned downwards in the second half, as funding needs 
declined with the accumulation of foreign reserves and as domestic bond 
markets became an increasingly significant source of financing for the 
region’s economies, capturing a larger share of global investors’ portfolio 
allocation. The region’s share of global emerging market external debt thus 
reached a low of 30% in 2008, remaining close to this level up to 2012 (see 
figures III.2 and III.3). 
Regarding Latin American and Caribbean external tradable debt by 
type of issuer, the share of corporate debt has now surpassed sovereign 
debt. In the 1990s, sovereign debt predominated, but corporate debt rose 
in the 2000s, and in 2012 there was more corporate debt outstanding than 
sovereign (figure III.4). 
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Figure iii.2 
total global emerging market external tradable  
debt: regional breakdown, 2000-2012
(Percentages)


































Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
Bank of America/Merrill Lynch Global Research, Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
Figure iii.3 
total global emerging market external tradable debt:  
regional breakdown, 2012
(Percentages) 







Africa and the Middle East 
(13)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
Bank of America/Merrill Lynch Global Research, Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
44 ECLAC
Figure iii.4 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: oUtstanding 




































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
Bank of America/Merrill Lynch Global Research, Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
The biggest share of the total outstanding global emerging market 
debt is domestic, however, not external. Domestic debt is now approximately 
88% of total outstanding GEM debt, according to Bank of America/Merrill 
Lynch, and most of that is government debt. Domestic government debt 
accounts for about 47% of total GEM debt outstanding, followed by domestic 
corporate debt at 41%. Asia accounts for 61% of the overall GEM domestic 
tradable debt total, while Latin America and the Caribbean represents 26%. 
In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, domestic debt was about 
86% of total outstanding debt in 2012, with domestic government debt 
accounting for 55%.The other 45% included domestic corporate debt (31%), 
and sovereign and corporate external debt (14%).2
2 The region’s domestic markets vary widely in size —with Brazil having the largest by far— and 
are generally dominated by the public sector. Despite their recent expansion, they continue to 
have two key vulnerabilities. First, the shift from external to domestic debt has contributed 
to reducing the risk from currency mismatches, but it may also have amplified the risk from 
maturity mismatches, as investors are still reluctant to commit their funds at fixed rates for 
long periods of time (Jeanneau and Tovar, 2008). This could expose Latin American and 
Caribbean borrowers to a significant degree of risk refinancing. Second, the narrow investor 
base at the domestic level hampers the development of secondary market liquidity.
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According to data from the Emerging Markets Trade Association (EMTA), 
the share of local market instruments in emerging markets’ total tradable debt 
peaked at 71% by 2011 before falling to 67% in 2012, up from only 26% in 1997. 
At the same time, the share of corporate bonds increased from 7% of the total 
amount of tradable Eurobonds in 2004 to 13.5% in 2012, while sovereign bonds 
decreased from 39% to only 18% in the same period (figure III.5). Emerging 
market sovereigns have become less reliant on external markets and the 
resilience shown by emerging market corporations throughout the credit crisis 
has led to an expansion in the emerging corporate bond universe. 
Figure iii.5 






















































Source: Emerging Markets Trade Association (EMTA).
Finally, the credit quality of the asset class has improved. By 2010, all 
three JP Morgan emerging market debt indices had an investment-grade rating: 
the Emerging Markets Bond Index Global, or EMBIG (Baa3/BB+), the Corporate 
Emerging Market Bond Index, or CEMBI (Baa2/BBB) and the Government 
Bond Index —Emerging Markets, or GBI-EM (Baa2/A–). The investor base for 
emerging market debt continued to grow after that and became increasingly 
diversified as a result. JP Morgan estimates that nearly 40% of total inflows 
between 2008 and 2012 came from a pool of investors who had typically 
invested in more traditional developed market debt and equities. 

Chapter IV
Developments in new debt issuance
The trends described in the last section took place against the background 
of a globalization process that generated substantial growth in the capital 
markets of developed economies. Retail and institutional investors increased 
their participation in capital markets, and companies raised more capital in 
bond and equity markets. 
In the 1990s, financial markets in advanced economies experienced such 
growth that by 2000 the combined bank credit, stock market capitalization 
and private bonds outstanding reached an average of about 250% of gross 
domestic product (GDP) for the G7 countries, compared to only 75% in 1970. 
This wave of capital market development and financial globalization was 
fostered by government policies that promoted financial liberalization; by 
technological and financial innovations that allowed lower-cost trading, 
more efficient clearing and settlement processes and the development of 
new financial instruments; and the emergence of mutual and pension funds 
that enabled investors to purchase securities at low cost and to diversify 
their investments across assets and countries. 
These global trends affected developing countries, as well. As new 
capital became available in international capital markets, developing 
countries tried to attract part of it to their domestic markets through a series 
of reforms, which included liberalization and privatization efforts and the 
emergence of pension funds. 1
1 For a more extensive discussion of these policies, see De la Torre and Schmukler (2004).
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The composition of capital flows to developing countries changed 
significantly in the 1990s and the 2000s relative to the 1970s and the 1980s. 
The share of official flows more than halved, with private capital flows 
becoming the major source of capital for a large number of countries. 
The nature of private capital flows also changed markedly. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) grew throughout the 1990s and continued to be strong in 
the 2000s, while portfolio flows also became very important, particularly 
bond flows. Figure IV.1 shows the composition of capital flows in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
Figure iv.1 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: Composition oF net private  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
the World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF) Database.
Before 1989, Latin America and the Caribbean had only limited access 
to the international bond market. The region’s access increased in the 1990s, 
however, and the importance of bonds as a source of external financing 
rose significantly, second only to FDI. The volume of international bond 
issuances rose sharply from US$ 2.8 billion in 1990 to a peak of US$ 54.4 billion 
in 1997, before falling in 1998 and 1999 (see figure IV.2). Corporate issuance 
represented a small share of the total amount issued in the 1990s, accounting 
for only one quarter of the regional total in 1999. In addition, most of the 
new debt issues were dollar denominated. The concept of original sin, or 
the inability of emerging markets to borrow in their own currency, was 
discussed extensively in the 1990s. 
In the 2000s, on the other hand, the major trends in the region included 
an increase in the issuance of local-currency-denominated debt and a rise in 
corporate issuance. In 2007, the share of local-currency-denominated bond 
issues in total Latin American external debt issuance, including sovereign 
and corporate debt, was an impressive 19%, compared with 5% in 2004 and 
no issues in local currency in 2002 and 2003. In 2012, corporate and bank 
issuance in Latin America accounted for 85% of the total, while sovereign 
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bonds accounted for 14%. The volume of international bond issues rose from 
US$ 40 billion in 2000 to a record of US$ 114.5 billion in 2012 (see figure IV.2). 
Brazil and Mexico, following the pattern of previous years, were the top 
issuers in the region (see table IV.1). 
Figure iv.2 












































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A. Rising above original sin
In their 1999 paper on exchange rates and financial fragility, Barry Eichengreen 
and Ricardo Hausmann advance the idea that developing countries are 
more vulnerable to international financial crises than developed countries 
because of the currency composition of their debts. According to the authors, 
for less developed countries “the domestic currency cannot be used to 
borrow abroad or to borrow long term, even domestically” (Eichengreen 
and Hausmann, 1999, p. 3). Many emerging market countries borrow in 
foreign currency instead, a situation the authors described as the original 
sin of international finance. 
More specifically, Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) show 
that “the composition of external debt —and specifically the extent to which 
that debt is denominated in foreign currency— is a key determinant of the 
stability of output, the volatility of capital flows, the management of exchange 
rates and the level of country credit ratings” (p. 3). The authors find greater 
output and capital volatility, lower credit ratings and a limited ability to 
manage an independent monetary policy for countries with a high degree of 
original sin. To highlight the relevance of the issue, the authors show that only 
a select number of countries are able to issue in their own currencies. While 
the major financial centres (namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Japan and Switzerland) issued only 34% of the total debt outstanding in 1993-
1998, debt denominated in their currencies amounted to 68% of the total. On 
the other hand, developing countries accounted for 10% of the debt, but less 
than 1% of the currency denomination in the same period.
Several possible determinants of original sin have been identified in 
the literature, such as the level of development, monetary credibility, fiscal 
solvency, the level of debt burden, credit market imperfections, the exchange 
rate regime, the slope of the yield curve (with an upward-sloping yield curve 
being associated with higher long-term borrowing to meet investor demand 
and, hence, lower original sin), the size of investor base, trade links and 
the strength of institutions. Testing the robustness of any determinant in 
particular is not the object of this book. Nonetheless, external debt issuance 
in local currency became more common in Latin America and the Caribbean 
following the economic adjustment and improvements in macroeconomic 
fundamentals and policies in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which included 
a more flexible exchange rate regime, an improved fiscal situation, inflation 
control, a more credible monetary policy based on inflation targets, a broader 
investor base and improved institutions such as better banking supervision. 
Despite the increase, however, local-currency debt still represents a small 
percentage of total issues, especially relative to major currencies such as the 
United States dollar (see figure IV.3). 
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Figure iv.3 
new debt issUanCe in latin ameriCa and the Caribbean:  
2011 and 2012 CUrrenCy breakdown 

































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, new external debt issuance in 
local currency jumped from nothing at all in 2002 and 2003 to 5.2% in 2004. 
It peaked at 19.2% of the total regional issues in 2007, but then declined 
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during the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. Total new external debt 
issuance reached record amounts in 2010 and 2011, with local-currency debt 
accounting for about 5.4% of the total in 2011. In 2012, debt issuance in local 
currency declined again to 3.7%, but currency diversification increased. For 
the first time in the region, there was debt issuance in Chinese offshore 
renmimbi and Australian dollars (see figure IV.4). 
The local currency share of 5.4% in 2011 was notable, and its decline 
to 3.7% in 2012 was not surprising. The advanced economies’ easy monetary 
stance brought global interest rates to historic low levels, and the record 
capital flows to emerging markets kept local currencies under pressure. 
In this scenario, companies and sovereigns found it advantageous to issue 
in hard currency (especially in United States dollars) rather than in local 
currencies, which in many cases were appreciating and strengthening against 
the United States dollar and other foreign currencies. 
Figure iv.4 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: annUal new debt  
issUanCe in loCal CUrrenCy 















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
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B. The rise in corporate issuance2
Another recent trend in the region’s debt market in the past decade has 
been a shift in external funding from sovereigns to corporations and banks. 
The external Eurobond component of the Latin American and Caribbean 
corporate asset class has grown remarkably in the period and has emerged 
as a mainstream product in the global credit space. While the size of gross 
Latin American and Caribbean external debt issuance has continued to rise, 
corporate issues have become the main driver of new supply (see figure IV.5). 
Figure iv.5 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: sovereign, Corporate and total 
external debt issUanCe, 2000-2012 
(US$ billions)


































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
Latin American and Caribbean corporate debt issuance increased 
more than eightfold from 2000 to 2012. In 2011, external debt issuance 
from the corporate sector outstripped sovereign issuance by more than 3:1, 
whereas in 2000, sovereign debt issuance exceeded external corporate debt 
issuance by more than 2:1. More significantly, in 2012, external debt issuance 
from the corporate sector outstripped sovereign issuance by more than 5:1. 
Sovereigns are now less inclined to tap international bond markets not only 
because they have developed their local markets, but because they have 
2 This section draws heavily on Lara (2011). 
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fewer funding needs after previous financial crises forced them to improve 
their debt dynamics.
The upward trend in the region’s issuance of external corporate 
debt steepened after the 2008 credit crisis. The average external corporate 
debt issuance in 2009-2012 represents an increase of 381% from the average 
volumes in the 2000-2007 period. Corporations dominated new issuance out 
of Latin America and the Caribbean in the 2009-2012 period as investors 
sought higher yields through both dollar and local-currency plays.
As emerging markets have matured, investment activity has picked up, 
especially corporate capital expenditure. Access to term funding in external 
markets has been key to financing this growth. External debt issuance from 
the Latin American corporate sector grew steadily as a share of total issuance 
throughout the 2000s, reaching 77.8% in 2007. Corporate issuance dried up 
in the wake of the 2008 crisis, however, while sovereign issuance remained 
relatively steady. As credit availability rebounded, corporate issuance activity 
regained momentum, reaching a record US$ 97 billion in 2012 (see figure IV.6) 
and accounting for 85% of the total external debt issuance (see figure IV.7), 
its biggest share ever.
Figure iv.6 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: sovereign and Corporate  
































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
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Figure iv.7 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: sovereign and Corporate external 
debt issUanCe, 2000-2012 































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
Yearly private corporate debt issuances in the international debt capital 
markets, including banks and financial issuers and excluding public sector 
and quasi-sovereign issuers, totalled US$ 54.9 billion from 2005 to 2007 (see 
figure IV.8). The annual breakdown was US$ 15.6 billion in 2005, US$ 20.2 billion 
in 2006 and US$ 19.1 billion in 2007. The private sector was crowded out by 
the public sector in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 global credit crisis, 
causing private issuances to drop dramatically to US$ 6 billion. Nevertheless, 
the volume of private issuance returned to pre-crisis levels by the end of 2009, 
with a total volume of US$ 22.2 billion, and it reached a historical peak of 
US$ 67.4 billion in 2012.
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Figure iv.8 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: volUme oF private yearly 



































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch. 
Note: Volumes do not include public sector or quasi-sovereign issuers. 
Brazilian corporate issuers have been the main driver of the increase 
in corporate bond issuance. Over a period of seven years, they increased 
their average weight in the region’s growing aggregate volume from 34% 
to 48% (see figure IV.9). Brazilian companies (both private and state owned) 
sold a record of US$ 46.64 billion in bonds in 2012, an increase of 534% from 
the US$ 7.36 billion in bonds sold in 2005. The share of Brazilian corporate 
bonds in the region’s total corporate issuance reached a historic peak in 2008, 
when Brazilian corporate issuers represented 62% of the region’s volume 
(see table IV.2). The increase in Brazilian corporations’ share in total regional 
corporate issuance in the past few years can be attributed to a number of 
factors, such as economic stabilization, an improvement in the regulatory 
environment governing securities markets, a growing demand for fixed-income 
securities by investors and the scarcity of bank credit as a source of major 
long-term financing. It can also be explained by the 2008 and 2009 upgrades of 
Brazil’s sovereign debt to investment grade by the main credit rating agencies. 
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Figure iv.9 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: breakdown oF international 
Corporate bond issUanCe by CoUntry







































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch. 
Note: Volumes include private and public sector or quasi-sovereign issuers.
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table iv.2 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: breakdown oF international 
Corporate bond issUanCe by CoUntry, 2005-2012 
(Percentages)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
argentina 2.51 5.11 8.44 0.67 1.01 2.60 1.73 0.06
barbados 0.93 0.59 0.00 0.00 1.01 0.27 0.00 0.00
brazil 34.15 48.25 23.87 61.89 48.84 52.37 51.47 48.01
Chile 4.64 4.18 0.77 0.00 6.23 7.49 6.56 8.39
Colombia 0.00 1.66 5.44 0.00 5.50 0.88 6.16 5.56
Costa rica 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.26
dominican republic 0.74 1.48 1.87 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.77
el salvador 0.00 1.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00
guatemala 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.51
honduras 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
Jamaica 2.32 2.68 4.33 0.00 1.68 1.53 0.41 1.80
mexico 44.46 24.43 28.74 25.81 27.19 28.47 25.17 23.91
panama 1.39 1.58 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 1.13
paraguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.52
peru 4.76 2.89 1.00 0.00 0.34 3.13 3.01 6.32
trinidad and tobago 0.46 1.97 0.00 0.00 1.91 0.00 0.24 0.00
Uruguay 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00
venezuela (bolivarian 
republic of) 0.00 0.39 23.19 6.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
supranational 3.64 3.22 1.67 4.61 6.29 2.18 3.72 2.76
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch. 
Note: Volumes include private, public sector or quasi-sovereign and supranational issuers. Supranational 
issuers include the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration (CABEI), the Caribbean Development Bank and NII Holdings, Inc. 
Mexico’s share, which represented almost 45% of the region’s volume 
in 2005, fell to 24% in 2012. Mexican companies (both private and state 
owned) sold US$ 23 billion of bonds in 2012, an increase of 143% from the 
US$ 9.6 billion of bonds sold in 2005. A number of factors contributed to the 
decline of Mexican corporations’ share in total regional corporate issuance 
in the 2005-2012 period. Mexico’s real interest rate was less attractive to 
foreign investors than the Brazilian rate, which was higher. In addition, 
given its closeness to the United States economy, the Mexican economy was 
hit hard by the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The decline in Mexican corporate 
issuances as a share of the total in 2005-2012 was driven by demand as well 
as supply. Investor demand for corporate bonds picked up by the end of the 
second quarter of 2009, however, as Mexico’s economy began pulling out 
of its first recession in eight years, and it peaked in 2010. Finally, Mexican 
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borrowers seem to have been less willing to take on dollar-denominated debt 
and its corresponding currency risk during this period, with some issuers 
recurring to the local capital debt markets and alternative local currency 
financial vehicles instead.
Together, Brazilian and Mexican corporates accounted for 72% of total 
corporate issuance in the Latin American and Caribbean region in 2012. 
Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, Panama and Peru accounted for another 23% 
of the total. Corporate issuers from Chile increased their volumes sharply 
in comparison with their pre-2008 volumes, from less than 1% of the total 
in 2007 to 8% in 2012. Colombian corporations similarly increased their 
issues from less than 2% of the region’s total in 2006 to 6% in 2012. Peruvian 
share of corporate issues grew from 1% in 2007 to 6% in 2012 (see table IV.2).
Not only has the issuer base become more diversified by country, but 
the Latin American and Caribbean corporate asset class has also developed 
a broader ratings and sectoral base. Although investment-grade corporate 
issuers continue to dominate annual supply, high-yield instruments have 
increased notably as a percentage of total issuance. In 2011, 30% of total regional 
corporate issuances (including private, quasi-sovereign and supranational 
issuers) were high-yield issuances, and 70% were investment grade (see 
figure IV.10). In 2012, however, the share of high-yield issuances declined 
to 21%. These ratings are consistent with sovereign debt and credit metrics, 
especially those of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Sovereign 
local- and foreign-currency bonds are the benchmark for corporate issuers 
(it is uncommon to find a corporate issuer with a higher rating than its host’s 
sovereign rating). The region’s external corporate debt is thus healthy from 
a ratings perspective.
From a sectoral perspective, about 56% of corporate debt issuances 
in 2012 came from two sectors: the financial and energy sectors. The financial 
sector was the main driver of the growth in corporate issuance in 2012, 
accounting for 34% of the total volume (see figure IV.11). Issuances from 
this sector include banks and financial services companies. The energy 
sector, including oil, gas and power, was the second most relevant sector in 
terms of aggregate volume (22% of total issuances). These two sectors were 
followed by telecommunications (12% of the total), mining and metals (11%), 
construction (6%), agriculture, agribusiness and food (5%) and industrial 
sectors such as petrochemicals, pulp and paper (5%). The remaining 5% 
include retail (2%), transportation (1%), infrastructure (1%) and utilities (1%). 
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Figure iv.10 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: breakdown oF international 
Corporate bond issUanCes by rating, 2011 and 2012













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
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Figure iv.11 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: breakdown oF international 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
C. Improving terms of borrowing
Terms of borrowing improved in the 2000s with respect to the late 1990s. The 
annual average maturity of new external bond issuance (weighted by the 
amount issued in United States dollars) peaked in 1997 and then declined 
steadily through the end of the decade. In the 2000s, the weighted average 
maturity of new external bond issuance improved from 2000 to 2006, when 
it reached a peak. In particular, from 2005 to 2008, Brazilian and Mexican 
corporations issued perpetual bonds in response to improved terms of 
borrowing. In 2012, after a hiatus, four Brazilian corporations and Brazil’s 
Banco do Brasil once again issued perpetual bonds.
Average maturity declined after the 2006 peak, particularly during the 
global financial crisis, but started to improve again in 2009 (see figure IV.12). In 
October 2010, Mexico issued an unprecedented 100-year bond. The government 
reopened the series in August 2011, as it looked to lock in historically low 
yields on the back-to-safety rally in United States Treasuries. This brought 
the total amount issued to US$ 2 billion. This trend towards longer average 
maturities contributes to reducing the potential volatility of bond flows. 
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Figure iv.12 
new external bond issUanCe in latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: 
annUal weighted average matUrity





































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
Note: Annual averages do not include perpetual bonds.
Borrowing costs, measured by the behaviour of spreads, followed a 
similar pattern. Spreads recorded a downward trend from 2002 to May 2007 and 
widened during the global financial crisis, but they have narrowed since 
then. At the end of 2012 spreads were close to the levels prevailing before 
the Asian crisis in 1997. However, although lower than during the global 
financial crisis, they were more volatile between 2009 and 2012 than in 
the 2002-2007 period. The evolution and performance of bond spreads are 
discussed in the next section.
Chapter V
Debt spreads rollercoaster: evolution  
and performance
Emerging market bond spreads over United States treasuries are often used 
as an indicator of sovereign risk, and they can be used to gauge a country’s 
access to international capital markets. The factors that influence bond spreads 
in emerging market economies have been subject to extensive debate. Most 
analysts agree that economic fundamentals have an impact on the level of 
spreads. Improvement in fundamentals, for example, should contribute to 
lowering the risk to investors, leading to tighter spreads. At the same time, 
external factors, such as investor sentiment or international interest rates, 
are also believed to influence the behaviour of bond spreads.
The borrowing costs for Latin America and the Caribbean, as measured 
by the behaviour of spreads, improved in the 2000s relative to the second 
half of the 1990s. Latin American debt spreads followed a downward trend 
from October 2002 to May 2007, when they reached a historic low (see 
figure V.1). Faster growth, lower inflation and tighter public finances in most 
countries played a role, as did investors’ increased appetite for risk due to 
abundant global liquidity. The spread compression was also supported by 
the broadening of the investor base.
The broader class of investors, including new buyers such as Asian 
central banks and United States pension funds, changed the nature of the 
commitment between buyers and issuers. In the past, Latin American markets 
received only short-term capital flows, but in the 2000s buyers were willing 
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to commit to longer-term goals, making liability management programmes 
more feasible. Sovereigns launched a variety of debt management operations 
during these years of spread compression, such as deleveraging, extending 
maturities, retiring expensive debt, switching from hard currency to local 
currency and increasing the proportion of fixed-income debt.
Figure v.1 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
JP Morgan, Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI).
Following a record low in May 2007, Latin American and Caribbean 
debt spreads reflected the increased volatility in the external backdrop, 
widening significantly during the global economic and financial crisis 
of 2008-2009, following Lehman Brothers’ collapse, and tightening back 
after peaking in November 2008. There were spikes in volatility in May and 
June 2010 and in the second half of 2011, when financial markets moved to 
reflect substantial downside economic risks from the fiscal turmoil in the 
euro area. Volatility was remarkably low from 2003 to 2007, but increased 
after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, more so than during the second 
half of the 1990s (see figure V.2). 
Risk premiums in the region rose less during the 2008-2009 crisis than 
in other critical episodes, such as the Asian, Russian and Argentine crises. 
This reflects the region’s improved macroeconomic policies and economic 
fundamentals. Although debt spreads did not return to the record low levels 
of 2007, by the end of 2012 they were close to the low levels of the pre-Asian 
crisis period in the mid-1990s.
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EMBIG spreads have closely tracked the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), 
a proxy for international investors’ appetite for risk in recent years, as 
depicted in figure V.2. Global financial conditions, such as the availability 
of international liquidity and international investors’ risk appetite, have had 
an important impact on borrowing costs for emerging markets.
Figure v.2 
Jp morgan embiga and Cboe volatility index 
(Left scale: basis points; right scale: VIX Close) 
Period of  unprecedented



































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
JP Morgan, Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) and from the Chicago Board Options Exchange [online] 
www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx.
a The JP Morgan EMBI Global Index (EMBIG) includes Chile and Uruguay in addition to the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries included in the EMBI+. The EMBIG expands on the composition of the 
EMBI+ by using a different country selection process and instrument selection process. The EMBI Global 
defines emerging market countries based on the World Bank’s definition of per capita income brackets and 
each country’s debt-restructuring history. These two criteria allow the EMBI Global to include a number 
of higher-rated countries that international investors have nevertheless considered part of the emerging 
market universe.
Note: The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX) is a key measure of market 
expectations of near-term volatility and a barometer of investor sentiment (conveyed by S&P 500 stock 
index option prices). Values greater than 30 are generally associated with a large amount of volatility, while 
values below 20 generally correspond to less stressful, even complacent, times in the markets.
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A. From reeling highs to historical lows: the driving 
forces behind spreads evolution
Most analysts agree that fundamentals have some impact on bond spreads in 
emerging market economies. Min (1998) stresses the importance of economic 
fundamentals in the determination of bond spreads. He finds that strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals in a country, such as low domestic inflation 
rates, improved terms of trade and increased foreign assets (as measured 
by the cumulative current account, the terms of trade and the real exchange 
rate), are associated with lower yield spreads. Specifically, in Latin America 
the volatility of bond spreads is highly correlated with the domestic inflation 
rate, the debt-to-GDP ratio and the ratio of international reserves to GDP.
Kamin and von Kleist (1999) analyse the launch spreads of 304 bonds 
issued in the 1990s, drawn from Euromoney’s Bondware. They conclude 
that spreads on emerging market instruments have strong and well-defined 
relationships to credit rating, maturity and currency denomination. Credit 
ratings on sovereign bonds, in this analysis, were based on a country’s 
adherence to financial fundamentals. In the 1990s, higher-rated bonds from 
countries that had better financial prospects were rewarded with tighter 
spreads than lower-rated bonds from countries that were less strict in their 
adherence to fundamentals. The authors admit, however, that investors 
required higher spreads from borrowers in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe than from borrowers in Asia and the Middle East. Although they 
do not elaborate as to the reason for this discrepancy, it is likely that market 
sentiment played a role in the determination of the level of spreads. 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) analyse data on about 1,000 developing 
country bonds issued during 1991-1996, considering both the issue decisions 
of debtors and underwriters and the pricing decisions of investors. Their 
results suggest that adherence to economic fundamentals leads to a higher 
probability of bond issuance and initially lower spreads. However, the 
authors believe that changes in fundamentals only partially explain the 
spread compression leading up to the Mexican crisis in 1994. 
Ades and others (2000) developed a framework to assess whether spreads 
are at their fair value, called the Goldman Sachs Equilibrium Sovereign Spread 
(GS-ESS). A country’s fair value spread is a function of the probability that it 
will default on its external obligations. This probability is a function of variables 
related to the country’s solvency, liquidity and debt-service track record, as 
well as global financial conditions. The valuation framework is based on a 
theoretical model that views emerging market economies as small borrowers 
in imperfect international capital markets. To generate the GS-ESS estimates, 
monthly data from 1996 onwards were assembled for 15 emerging market 
economies. For each country, one benchmark bond was selected, typically 
between 10 and 20 years of maturity. The results of the model, which are robust 
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to a variety of diagnostic and statistical tests, indicate that with the exception 
of Mexico, all Latin American countries in the sample were undervalued at 
the time the paper was written (October 2000), with prices below, and spreads 
above, the long-term equilibrium level. The implication was that other factors 
must have influenced the determination of bond spreads in emerging markets, 
which could explain the volatility of bond flows in the 1990s.
Some studies hold the view that external factors are the main 
determinants of bond spreads. They try to measure market sentiment by 
identifying external factors that affect bond spreads, such as the level of 
interest rates in major developed countries as a gauge of liquidity in global 
bond markets, measures of stock market volatility as proxies for risk appetite 
or aversion and commodity prices, which affect emerging market spreads and 
emerging market economies in general. In doing this, these papers compare 
the relative effects of internal factors (fundamentals) versus external ones. 
Cline and Barnes (1997) suggest that a global capital surplus led to 
the decline in bond spreads before the Asian crisis. Their study finds that 
emerging market spreads fell systematically from 1995 to mid-1997 by more 
than can be explained by improved borrower fundamentals. They believe 
that spreads were too low to be sustainable and the crisis was a correction. 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) also suggest that global interest rates affect bond 
spreads in emerging markets. Their study shows that the slow compression 
of spreads before the Mexican and Asian crises was caused by liberal credit 
conditions in the world’s major money centres. On the other hand, Kamin 
and von Kleist (1999) find no relationship between industrial country interest 
rates and emerging market bond spreads, while Min (1998) also finds that 
external shocks such as oil prices and the international interest rate are 
insignificant in determining bond spreads. 
Maier and Vasishtha (2008) summarize two views for the decline in 
emerging market bond spreads in the 2000s. First, the decline in spreads 
was a result of structural reforms and the improvement in emerging 
markets’ macroeconomic policies and economic fundamentals. Second, 
favourable global economic factors and financial conditions explain much 
of the improvement in spreads, given that risk spreads fell for all asset 
classes. Using factor analysis to study the extent to which emerging market 
bond spreads were driven by global factors, as opposed to country-specific 
macroeconomic fundamentals, the authors conclude that better macroeconomic 
policies, including lower inflation and lower debt, were the most important 
factor in the reduction in spreads after 2002. On the other hand, Fostel and 
Kaminsky (2007), who examine Latin America’s access to international capital 
markets from 1980 to 2005, conclude that sound fundamentals matter, but 
the upsurge in international lending to Latin America starting in 2003 was 
mainly driven by a dramatic increase in global liquidity and investors’ 
changing risk behaviour. 
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Although country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals play an 
important role in the determination of spreads, global conditions are also 
significant. Whether domestic or external factors have the biggest influence 
on spreads depends, for the most part, on the time period in question. In the 
following section, we focus on the external drivers of bond spreads, examining 
empirically whether market sentiment was a significant factor in determining 
Latin American and Caribbean bond spreads in the 1990s and the 2000s. 
B. Market sentiment and the behaviour of debt spreads 
To assess whether market sentiment was significant in the determination of 
bond spreads in Latin America in the 1990s and the 2000s, we estimated the 
elasticity of the Latin component of the JP Morgan EMBI+ with respect to its 
non-Latin component using monthly data for December 1996 to December 2012. 
The period covers the Asian crisis, the Russian default, Brazil’s devaluation, 
Argentina’s debt crisis, the boom of 2003-2008 and the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis. An elasticity higher than zero would imply that the cost of borrowing 
in Latin American markets is correlated with the cost of borrowing in non-
Latin countries, regardless of whether or not Latin American fundamentals 
justified any change. Interestingly, we found a significant elasticity of 0.56 for 
the period as a whole (see table V.1). Thus, an increase of 1.0% in spreads 
in non-Latin countries in this period meant an increase of roughly 0.5% 
in Latin American spreads. Part of the change in Latin American spreads, 
therefore, was explained by events in other emerging markets, which may 
have influenced investors’ perception of Latin American risk.
table v.1 
elastiCity CoeFFiCients oF latin versUs non-latin Components  
oF the embi+ 
Elasticity coefficient  t statistic
1997 - 2012 0.56 18.96
*1997 - 2002 0.28 4.10
First half:1997 -1999 0.54 16.80
second half: 2000 - 2002 -0.35 -3.44
*2003 - 2008 1.24 19.70
First half: 2003 - 2005 1.41 27.69
second half: 2006 - 2008 0.89 29.85
*2009 - 2012 0.63 21.35
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of monthly 
JP Morgan EMBI+ spreads.
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However, the elasticity changes throughout the period. During the 
financial crises of the late 1990s (1997 to 2002), the elasticity of the Latin 
component of the JP Morgan EMBI+ with respect to its non-Latin component 
is lower: 0.28. When we break this period in two, the elasticity is 0.54 in the 
first half (1997-1999) and negative in the second half (2000-2002). Contagion 
was higher in the first half than it was in the second half. The Asian crisis 
of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998 were very contagious, affecting several 
countries. In contrast, the 2001 Argentine crisis had a smaller impact on the 
rest of the region and on other emerging markets (except for the impact on 
neighbour Uruguay, which was very significant) than the Asian and Russian 
crises. Argentina’s crisis was foreseen, whereas the earlier emerging markets 
crises had the element of surprise, causing financial markets to react strongly 
to unanticipated events. 
Didier, Mauro and Schmukler (2006) argue that investors’ anticipation 
of the Argentine crisis could explain the lack of contagion compared with 
the Asian and Russian crises. More than two years before the crisis, mutual 
funds began reducing their exposure to Argentina. By the time of Argentina’s 
default in December 2001, the impact on spreads in other countries of the 
region was muted (see figure V.3). In contrast, mutual funds did not seem 
to reduce their exposure in advance of the other crises.
Figure v.3 
































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of monthly 
JP Morgan EMBI+ spreads.
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The elasticity increased to 1.24 during the commodity price boom 
from 2003 to 2008. This seems to suggest that global conditions did have a 
role in the decline of emerging market bond spreads during this period. As 
noted earlier, risk spreads also fell for all other asset classes. The amount of 
global liquidity available at that time likely played a role in the reduction of the 
debt spreads in the region, regardless of the improvement in macroeconomic 
variables in each country. Here again, the elasticity coefficient was higher 
in the first half of the period (2003-2005), at 1.41, than in the second half 
(2006-2008), at 0.89, but it remained very high throughout. 
Finally, the elasticity decreased to 0.63 from 2009 to 2012, a period 
that covers the global financial crisis and the subsequent recovery. The cost 
of borrowing in Latin American markets continued to be correlated with 
the cost of borrowing in non-Latin countries, meaning that events in other 
emerging markets continue to play a role in the level of spreads in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
To evaluate the effect of changes within the region on individual countries, 
we calculated the elasticity coefficient of individual Latin American country 
spreads relative to the spread for Latin American countries as a group (with 
the specific individual country excluded from the total). The results are 
shown in table V.2. The spreads for all individual Latin American countries 
in the sample were responsive to changes within the region in the period 
analysed (December 1997 to December 2012). The coefficients are statistically 
significant, but the very high t statistics suggest that the data points might 
be serially correlated, that is, that the individual country spreads may be 
correlated with the regional spread. 
table v.2 
elastiCity CoeFFiCients For individUal CoUntries with respeCt  
to the regional total








venezuela (bolivarian republic of) 0.50 8.47
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of monthly JP 
Morgan EMBI+ spreads.
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We also look at correlation coefficients between spreads of the 
Latin American countries in the sample, first for the period between 
December 1997 and December 2012 and then for the period between 
May 1999 and December 2012 to include Colombia. Our results indicate that 
although markets had some capacity to differentiate among Latin American 
countries on the basis of policies and fundamentals throughout the period, 
they also perceived them as a group when assigning risk. This practice was 
conducive to market volatility, and it indicates that market sentiment was an 
important component in the determination of spreads (tables V.3 and V.4). 
table v.3 
Correlation CoeFFiCients, deCember 1997 to deCember 2012







ecuador -0.03 0.40 1.00
mexico 0.13 0.70 0.76 1.00
panama 0.45 0.81 0.68 0.88 1.00
peru 0.39 0.88 0.56 0.85 0.93 1.00
venezuela, 
(bolivarian 
republic of) 0.14 0.30 0.52 0.49 0.40 0.40 1.00
embi+ 0.31 0.83 0.68 0.95 0.91 0.93 0.47 1.00
embi+ latin 
america 0.56 0.93 0.52 0.80 0.88 0.92 0.52 0.92 1.00
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of monthly JP 
Morgan EMBI+ spreads.
table v.4 
Correlation CoeFFiCients, may 1999 to deCember 2012







Colombia 0.48 0.89 1.00
ecuador -0.03 0.40 0.55 1.00
mexico 0.13 0.70 0.82 0.76 1.00
panama 0.45 0.81 0.94 0.68 0.88 1.00
peru 0.39 0.88 0.95 0.56 0.85 0.93 1.00
venezuela, 
(bolivarian 
republic of) 0.14 0.30 0.33 0.52 0.49 0.40 0.40 1.00
embi+ 0.31 0.83 0.88 0.68 0.95 0.91 0.93 0.47 1.00
embi+ latin 
america 0.56 0.93 0.89 0.52 0.80 0.88 0.92 0.52 0.92 1.00
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of monthly 
JP Morgan EMBI+ spreads.
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External factors thus play an important role in determining the behaviour 
of emerging market spreads. Rozada and Yeyati (2006) indicate that a large 
fraction of the variability of emerging market bond spreads is explained 
by the evolution of global, or exogenous, factors such as risk appetite (as 
reflected in the spread of high-yield corporate bonds in developed markets), 
global liquidity (measured by the international interest rates) and contagion 
(from systemic events like the Russian default). Hartelius, Kashiwase and 
Kodres (2008) set out to empirically distinguish between improved economic 
fundamentals and ample global liquidity in the determination of emerging 
market spreads; they conclude that although fundamentals, as embedded 
in credit ratings, are very important, expectations for future United States 
interest rates and the volatility of those expectations are a key determinant 
of emerging markets spreads as well. In the following sections, we examine 
the effects of changes in United States interest rates on emerging market 
bond spreads and the behaviour of United States high-yield corporate bond 
spreads compared to the behaviour of Latin American and Caribbean spreads 
to determine whether their behaviour pattern is similar. 
C. United States interest rates and Latin American 
and Caribbean debt spreads 
The relationship between movements in mature and emerging markets can 
be weaker or stronger at times, and there are channels through which this 
link takes place. One natural channel is the effect of interest rates in mature 
markets on spreads in emerging markets. Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart 
(1993) stress the importance of United States interest rates in driving the 
international capital flow cycle and show that the surge of capital inflows in 
the early 1990s was closely associated with a combination of three factors: 
lower United States interest rates, lower stock market and real estate returns 
and a slackening in economic activity.
Fernández-Arias (1995) shows that international interest rates have both 
a direct effect on the cost of capital in a financially integrated economy and an 
indirect impact on the countries’ creditworthiness, which in turn affects risk 
spreads and the cost of capital. This indirect channel of transmission is due 
to the fact that a country’s capacity to pay depends on the present value of its 
future resources, which increases as the discount rate declines. In countries 
with high-risk spreads, this indirect effect may be large and may predominate 
over the direct effect. Evidence presented in Fernández-Arias (1995) and Frankel 
and Roubini (2000) suggests that country risk and creditworthiness in many 
emerging markets are indeed influenced by international interest rates in a 
way that amplifies the interest cycle in industrial countries. 
Theoretically, a rise in United States interest rates would lead to 
an increase in emerging market spreads through its impact on the ability 
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of debtor countries to repay loans. A rise in United States interest rates 
could also reduce investors’ appetite for risk, leading to a reduction in 
their exposure in risky markets and the availability of financial resources 
in borrowing countries (Kamin and von Kleist, 1999). Conversely, a fall in 
United States interest rates would ease debt-service payments, reducing the 
likelihood of default and compressing emerging market spreads. Another 
reason for a positive correlation between a fall in United States interest rates 
and a reduction in emerging market spreads is that investors, seeking to 
enhance the overall return on their portfolios, switch to emerging market 
debt whenever yields in mature markets fall.
The empirical evidence on how United States monetary policy affects 
emerging market spreads is less conclusive, as shown in table V.5. From 
March 1996 to December 2012, we find a statistically significant positive 
correlation of 0.26 (at the 95% confidence level) between the 10-year United 
States Treasury bond yield and the Latin component of the EMBI+, as expected. 
The correlation between Latin American spreads and the United States 
federal funds target rate over the period was also positive and statistically 
significant, albeit weaker: 0.08.1
However, if we isolate periods of change in United States monetary 
policy in the second half of the 1990s and in the 2000s, the correlation 
between United States interest rates and Latin American spreads becomes 
negative. During the United States Federal Reserve’s last tightening cycle 
(June 2004 to July 2006), Latin American external debt spreads were negatively 
correlated to the increase in the United States federal funds target rate (see 
figure V.4). The negative correlation between the EMBI+ LATIN monthly 
spreads and the monthly United States federal funds rate from June 2004 to 
June 2006 was strong (–0.96) and significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Latin American external debt spreads were negatively correlated with the 
increase in the 10-year United States Treasury bond yield as well, showing 
a negative correlation coefficient of –0.51. Although theoretically Latin 
American spreads were expected to move in the same direction as United 
States interest rates, substantial current account surpluses, along with a more 
1 In much of the existing literature, the yield on United States Treasury bonds has been used 
as a proxy for United States monetary policy. The 10-year United States Treasury bond 
yield is used as an approximate benchmark for the J. P. Morgan EMBI+. However, there 
are occasions when shocks to United States Treasury yields are not necessarily the result of 
changes in United States monetary policy. Table V.4 shows, for example, that the correlation 
between the yield on 10-year United States Treasury bonds and the federal funds target 
rate was not always very marked in the second half of the 1990s. Likewise, during the 
Asian crisis, short-term United States Treasury bond yields fluctuated dramatically even 
in the absence of changes in United States monetary policy. The United States federal funds 
target rate seems to be a more direct measure of the monetary policy stance in the United 
States, so we used both measures —the yield on 10-year United States Treasury bonds and 
the United States federal funds target rate— when calculating correlations with emerging 
market spreads.
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prudent fiscal stance in most countries of the region in years prior, increased 
the region’s resilience to sudden changes in the external environment and 
in global interest rates.
table v.5 
Correlations between United states interest rates and  
the latin Component oF the embi+









Fed fund (effective) (percentages) 1
United states 10-year 0.84 1
embiplUs_lat strip spread (percentages) 0.08 0.26 1









Fed fund (effective) (percentages) 1
United states 10-year 0.76 1
embiplUs_lat strip spread (percentages) -0.19 -0.43 1









Fed fund (effective) (percentages) 1
United states 10-year 0.54 1
embiplUs_lat strip spread (percentages) -0.64 -0.71 1









Fed fund (effective) (percentages) 1
United states 10-year 0.67 1
embiplUs_lat strip spread (percentages) -0.34 -0.25 1
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Fed fund (effective) (percentages) 1
United states 10-year 0.63 1
embiplUs_lat strip spread (percentages) -0.96 -0.51 1









Fed fund (effective) (percentages) 1
United states 10-year 0.73 1
embiplUs_lat strip spread (percentages) -0.81 -0.71 1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of monthly data 
from the United States Federal Reserve and JP Morgan Latin EMBI+ spreads.
During the Federal Reserve’s easing cycle between September 2007 and 
December 2008, the correlation between United States interest rates and Latin 
American spreads was also negative. The negative correlation between the 
EMBI+ LATIN monthly spreads and the United States federal monthly funds 
rate from September 2007 to December 2008 was strong (–0.81) and significant 
at 95% level of confidence. Latin American external debt spreads were also 
negatively correlated to declines in the 10-year United States Treasury Bond yield 
(with a negative correlation coefficient of –0.71). This was a period of turmoil in 
global financial markets, with high levels of volatility and uncertainty, causing 
spreads to shoot up. United States interest rates were dropping in response to 
the global financial crisis in an attempt to stimulate the United States economy, 
but risk aversion continued to increase, leading to a widening of debt spreads 
in emerging markets and Latin America and the Caribbean (see figure V.4).
Although United States interest rates have an impact on the level 
of emerging market spreads, the relationship can become more nuanced 
during periods of turmoil in global financial markets. In addition, the 
strengthening of macroeconomic fundamentals and the accumulation of 
current acocunt surpluses and foreign reserves by Latin American and 
Caribbean countries in the 2000s have given them a degree of independence 
from United States interest rates. Consequently, Latin American spreads 
continued their descent from June 2004 to June 2006 despite a series of 
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Strip Spread (%)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of monthly data 
from the United States Federal Reserve and JP Morgan Latin EMBI+ spreads.
Latin American bond spreads were thus positively correlated 
with United States interest rates during the period as a whole, but the 
correlation became stronger and changed direction for isolated periods. 
The correlation coefficients do not identify which variable is driving the 
other, but the assumption is that United States interest rates are external 
drivers of Latin American and emerging market spreads. Until recently, 
market participants held the view that capital flows could not affect interest 
rates in the United States. 
However, Warnock and Warnock (2006) show that international 
capital flows had an economically important effect on the 10-year United 
States Treasury bond from June 2004 to July 2006, when the United States 
Federal Reserve raised the target federal funds rate in 17 consecutive 
meetings, taking it from 1% to 5.25%. The puzzling feature in this epsiode 
was that long-term interest rates did not increase as much as they did in 
previous tightening cycles. In fact, long-term rates declined throughout 
most of 2004 and 2005, despite the steady increases in short-term rates. The 
authors find that foreign flows had an economically large and statistically 
significant impact on long-term United States interest rates. Their work 
also suggests that large foreign purchases of United States government 
bonds contributed substantially to the low levels of United States interest 
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rates observed over the previous years. The improvement in growth and 
macroeconomic conditions in some large emerging market economies have 
thus had an impact on the relationship between emerging market spreads 
and the United States interest rates.
The current fragile global financial environment has placed the United 
States in a unique position. The United States debt burden has become 
heavier as a result of the unprecedented policy response to the global 
financial crisis and economic recession, when the Federal Reserve brought 
the federal funds target rate to a range of 0 to 25 basis points and embarked 
on quantitative easing, launching three rounds of asset purchases to ease 
monetary conditions. Foreign investors have been accumulating United 
States assets at a rapid rate, and they owned more than US$ 25 trillion of 
United States assets at the end of 2012, according to the United States Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. More than US$ 5.5 trillion in United States Treasury 
securities alone are held by foreign official institutions, mainly central banks 
and government investment funds. 
The United States absorbs roughly 70% of all net savings produced 
by the world’s current account surplus countries. Borrowing on this scale 
by any large country is unprecedented in modern world history, and this 
has had an impact on the relationship between United States interest rates 
and emerging market spreads. When investors buying Treasury securities 
cease to be satisfied with the scanty returns (given the low interest rate 
environment set by the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy), the United 
States’ dependence on foreign borrowing may become a significant 
vulnerability, particularly in the event of a shock. 
From the region’s perspective, the prospect of higher United 
States interest rates and Treasury yields following the end of the Federal 
Reserve’s quantitative easing and easy monetary policy is a concern for 
many buyers of Latin American bonds. The end of quantitative easing 
will almost certainly slow the flow of money into the region. Given the 
high degree of global financial interconnectedness, it is safe to assume 
that Latin American bonds would not be insulated from an increase in 
risk aversion. Bond spreads would probably increase as a result, but it 
is difficult to estimate the impact on the region’s bond markets. As we 
have just shown, the existing empirical evidence shows that during 
isolated periods of change in United States monetary policy and of 
financial turmoil, the relationship between United States interest rates 
and emerging market spreads is more nuanced and complicated than 
the theory implies. This means that during these periods of change and 
turbulence, the other determinants of emerging markets spreads (other 
than United States interest rates) tend to play a larger role.
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D. Latin American and Caribbean debt spreads  
and mature equity markets
Another intuitive channel for the relationship between mature and emerging 
markets is the link with stock markets. Short-run correlations between emerging 
and United States equity markets have historically been high, but volatile. 
Since the late 1990s, world equity values (United States equity in particular) 
have also been closely associated with emerging bond markets (figure V.5). 
One explanation for the close relationship is that spread changes in the 
United States corporate sector may trigger corresponding spread changes in 
emerging market sovereign debt, as investors engage in arbitrage between 
similarly risky assets.
Figure v.5 
Jp morgan latin embi+ spreads and monthly s&p 500 index Closing, 
deCember 1996-deCember 2012 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
JP Morgan EMBI+ and Standard & Poor’s.
 
Between December 1996 and December 2012, Latin EMBI+ spreads and the 
S&P 500 index were negatively correlated (–0.38). This correlation became 
positive (0.04), but very weak, during the period of financial crises in the 
late 1990s (December 1996 to December 2002) (see table V.6). The positive 
correlation was much stronger (0.55) in the first half of this period, from 
December 1996 to December 1999. Given the increased volatility of the period 
and the presence of contagion, the positive correlation may be explained by 
investors seeking to retrench from a variety of risky assets, and not only 
emerging market debt. 
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For most of the 2000s, on the other hand, investors did not retrench 
from risky assets, but sought them (engaging in arbitrage between available 
risky assets), as risk aversion remained low.The emerging market external 
debt and the Standard & Poor’s stock market index have been fairly strongly 
(negatively) correlated in recent years. It seems that the EMBI+ Latin tends 
to tighten when the Standard & Poor’s index rises, and to widen when 
the Standard & Poor’s index falls. This relationship was even closer in the 
2003-2008 period (figure V.6).
Figure v.6 
Jp morgan latin embi+ spreads and monthly s&p 500 index Closing, 
JanUary 2003-deCember 2012 
(Basis points and month-end closing prices) 
EMBI+ LATIN 
spreads (left axis)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
JP Morgan EMBI+ and Standard & Poor’s.
During the 2003-2008 commodity boom, the negative correlation 
between the S&P 500 index month-end closing prices and the monthly EMBI+ 
Latin spreads was particularly strong (–0.93) and statistically significant. Latin 
American spreads and the S&P 500 remained strongly negatively correlated 
from 2009 to 2012 (–0.67), although the correlation was a little weaker than 
in the previous boom years. Assuming that Latin American spreads and the 
S&P 500 remain negatively correlated in the coming months, trends in the 




Correlations between s&p 500 index and the latin Component  
oF the embi+
december 1996 - december 2012
embi+ latin spreads s&p 500 index month-end closing prices 
embi+ latin spreads 1
s&p 500 index month-end closing prices -0.38 1
december 1996 - december 2002
embi+ latin spreads s&p 500 index month-end closing prices 
embi+ latin spreads 1
s&p 500 index month-end closing prices 0.04 1
december 1996 - december 1999
embi+ latin spreads s&p 500 index month-end closing prices 
embi+ latin spreads 1
s&p 500 index month-end closing prices 0.55 1
January 2003 - december 2008
embi+ latin spreads s&p 500 index month-end closing prices 
embi+ latin spreads 1
s&p 500 index month-end closing prices -0.93 1
January 2009 - december 2012
embi+ latin spreads s&p 500 index month-end closing prices 
embi+ latin spreads 1
s&p 500 index month-end closing prices -0.67 1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
JP Morgan EMBI+ and Standard & Poor’s.
E. Latin American and Caribbean debt spreads 
versus United States high-yield corporate bonds
Another financial linkage between the United States and the region 
is through United States bond markets. On average, Latin American 
assets have become more attractive relative to other asset classes, such 
as United States high-yield corporate bonds. In the past, Latin American 
and Caribbean debt spreads were comparable to the spreads on United 
States junk bonds in terms of riskiness (see figure V.7); in the 1990s 
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through mid-2005, United States high-yield spreads were actually lower 
than Latin American spreads. At the end of 2007, Latin American spreads 
were roughly half the spreads on United States junk bonds, and although 
this gap has diminished, Latin American and Caribbean assets continue 
to post much lower spreads.
Figure v.7 


































































































































EMBI+ LATINEMBI+ U.S. high-yield bond spreads




Pre-Asian Crisis EM and LA Spreads
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
Bank of America/Merrill Lynch United States High-Yield Master II Index (H0A0), Bank of America/Merril 
Lynch United States Treasury Current 10 years (GA10), and JP Morgan EMBI+.
Bond spreads tended to deteriorate after the Asian crisis. Although 
emerging market bond spreads generally recovered soon after each 
crisis period, the recovery was never in full, and from 1997 to the 
end of 2004 the level of the spreads remained a lot higher than in the 
pre-crisis period. The most immediate explanation for the increase in 
spreads in the second half of the 1990s is that investors perceived worse 
country prospects in emerging and Latin American markets. However, 
spreads not only increased in emerging countries in general, but also 
increased substantially for United States corporate high-yield bonds. 
Table V.6 shows the correlation between EMBI+ Latin spreads and Merrill 
Lynch Master High-Yield Index spreads, which is 0.45 for the period as 
a whole (December 1996 to December 2012), but much stronger for the 
period of the Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises (0.76). 
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The results suggest that the explanation of the deterioration of bond 
spreads after the Asian crisis may be unrelated to reassessments of countries’ 
prospects. The results lend support to the liquidity crunch argument. On some 
occasions, heightened risk in emerging markets induces investors to lower 
their risk profile altogether and switch to investment-grade bonds or other 
instruments. For example, during the Russian crisis, between August and 
October 1998, the Merrill Lynch High-Yield Master Index widened by 275 basis 
points against Treasuries, even though the corporate credit quality in the 
United States was not central to the problem affecting financial markets.
Flows between emerging markets and the high-yield sector have 
not followed a consistent pattern. From December 1996 to December 2003, 
which includes the financial crises of the late 1990s, the correlation between 
monthly EMBI+ LATIN and Merrill Lynch United States High-Yield Master 
Index spreads was strongly positive (0.76) and statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level (see table V.7). 
table v.7 
Correlations between United states high-yield master index and the 
latin Component oF the embi+
december 1996 - december 2012
embi+ latin U.s. high-yield bond spreads
embi+ latin 1
U.s. high-yield bond spreads 0,45 1
december 1996 - december 2003 
embi+ latin U.s. high-yield bond spreads
embi+ latin 1
U.s. high-yield bond spreads 0,76 1
January 2004 - may 2007
embi+ latin U.s. high-yield bond spreads
embi+ latin 1
U.s. high-yield bond spreads 0,14 1
June 2007 - december 2012
embi+ latin U.s. high-yield bond spreads
embi+ latin 1
U.s. high-yield bond spreads 0,91 1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
Bank of America/Merrill Lynch United States High-Yield Master II Index (H0A0), Bank of America/Merril 
Lynch United States Treasury Current 10 years (GA10), and JP Morgan EMBI+.
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Emerging markets were well cushioned against financial market 
volatility by the end of 2003, however. Latin American and emerging market 
spreads decoupled from United States corporate spreads during the turmoil 
in United States credit markets in May 2005, caused by the downgrading of 
General Motors and Ford. Latin American and emerging market spreads 
peaked earlier (in mid-April) and returned more quickly to their previous 
lows. The correlation index between Latin American and United States 
monthly high-yield spreads fell to only 0.14 from January 2004 to May 2007, 
when emerging market and Latin American spreads reached a historical 
low. This episode of weakening linkages with United States corporate bonds 
coincided with a commodity price boom and the accumulation of current 
account surpluses and international foreign reserves by emerging market 
and Latin American countries. 
 In the period following the global financial crisis, Latin American 
bond apreads were strongly correlated with United States corporate yields 
(0.91). It is hard to determine statistically which variable has been driving 
the other, and it is very possible that both variables are in reality driven 
simultaneously by other factors, such as changes in the external backdrop. 
In 2009-2012, both Latin American and United States high-yield bond spreads 
benefited from the Federal Reserve’s accommodative policies and the global 
search for yield, as well as from a larger investor base. 
Investors have many choices, and there may be situations in which 
they choose to swap high-yield corporates for emerging market debt, as 
occurrred during the turbulence in the United States automobile sector in 
May 2005. Alternatively, heightened risk aversion could cause them to lower 
their risk profile and leave high-yield and emerging market bonds altogether, 
switching to investment-grade bonds. However, many emerging market and 
Latin American issuers have earned higher credit ratings in recent years, 
bringing them closer to investment grade. This trend has contributed to a 




The long road to improved credit quality
The increasing trend towards higher credit ratings for emerging market 
issuers in recent years reflected faster growth, lower inflation and tighter 
public finances in most emerging markets, as well as the benign global 
environment, with plentiful liquidity and an increasing risk appetite. This 
trend supported the sharp compression of bond spreads beginning in late 2002. 
Moreover, the higher overall credit quality of emerging market debt and the 
risk-adjusted returns of the asset class attracted a broader investor base to 
absorb the significant amounts of new debt issued between 2003 and 2012.
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are designed to reduce information 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, and as such they play a key 
role in financial markets in gathering and analysing data that can be used to 
assess the credit quality of a corporate or sovereign issuer. The role of CRAs has 
expanded with financial globalization and received an additional boost from 
Basel II, which incorporates CRA ratings into the rules for weighting credit risk.
The CRAs have fallen under renewed criticism since the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Their poor performance has brought back questions about 
their methods, their regulatory status and their role in financial markets, 
which first arose during the financial crises in emerging markets in the 
late 1990s and the collapse of Enron in 2001. However, ratings can be useful 
for assessing credit quality where accounting standards are low and where 
creditor markets are not well developed. In this specific context, CRAs 
provide additional scrutiny and undertake the costly task of gathering and 
inspecting data. 
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The role of credit rating agencies is to provide investors with assessments 
of borrowers’ present and future willingness to pay. This task involves 
gathering information about what may happen in the future, which is 
naturally dominated by expectations. Even well-informed agents, such as 
rating agencies and institutional investors, are subject to expectations. Whether 
credit rating agencies can contribute to the dynamics of a financial crisis by 
either accentuating or attenuating it has been subject to extensive debate. 
The literature examines the determinants of sovereign ratings, their alleged 
procyclicality and the relationship between spreads and sovereign ratings. 
Cantor and Packer (1996) show that five variables —namely, GDP 
per capita, indicator variables for economic development and for sovereign 
default history, inflation and external debt— explain 90% of the ratings 
issued by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s in 1995.1 The authors also find 
that the market, as gauged by sovereign debt yields, broadly shared the 
relative rankings of sovereign credit risks made by Standard & Poor’s and 
Moody’s during the 1987-1994 period. However, credit ratings “appeared to 
have some independent influence on yields over and above their correlation 
with other publicly available information” (p. 37). In particular, their results 
show that rating announcements had immediate effects on market pricing 
for non-investment-grade issues. 
Larraín, Reisen and von Maltzan (1997) find that a “negative outlook” 
review by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s had a significant impact in 1987-
1996, and conclude that rating agencies have the potential to soothe boom-bust 
spread cycles. Reisen and von Maltzan (1998), who study changes in ratings 
and outlooks by Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s between 1989 and 1997, 
conclude that downgrades have a significant impact on spreads, whereas 
upgrades are anticipated by the markets. Jaramillo and Tejada (2011), using 
a panel dataset for 35 emerging market economies for the period 1997-2010, 
find that sovereign spreads for investment-grade countries are 36% lower 
than for speculative-grade countries, which the authors say is “above and 
beyond what is implied by macroeconomic fundamentals” (p. 3). They 
conclude that spreads are reduced more significantly when sovereigns cross 
the threshold to investment-grade than when sovereigns are upgraded within 
credit categories (sub-investment or investment grade).
Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) examine the alleged procyclicality of 
sovereign ratings during financial crises, concluding that Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s failed to predict the Asian crisis and even exarcebated it by 
downgrading Asian countries more than was justified by the fundamentals. 
In contrast, Kräussl (2000) argues that massive downgrades do not necessarily 
intensify a crisis, as was the case of South Korea in 1997. Sy (2001) emphasizes 
that the strong negative relationship between ratings and EMBI+ spreads 
1 Afonso (2003) updated Cantor and Packer’s study to find similar results.
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declines during periods of market turbulence. The R2 coefficient of a simple 
regression of log spreads on ratings declined during periods of market 
turmoil, indicating that the relationship between spreads and ratings is less 
significant during a crisis.
Credit ratings and spreads are negatively related, but the role of 
the CRAs and the impact of their announcements on bond spreads vary 
depending on the period analysed. The ratings/spreads relationship is very 
important, but the causality is not always clear. In the following sections, we 
look at the evolution of credit ratings in Latin America and the Caribbean 
in the 1990s and 2000s and at the relationship between credit ratings and 
bond spreads during this period. 
A. The evolution of Latin American and Caribbean 
credit ratings 
The 1990s witnessed a sharp increase in the number of rated Latin American 
and Caribbean sovereigns, particularly after 1992 (see table VI.1). The most 
rapid increase in the number of rated sovereigns occurred in 1992-1997, as a 
growing number of governments began to tap global bond markets. By the 
end of the decade, twenty Latin American and Caribbean countries were 
rated, as opposed to only one in 1990 (namely, the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela). By the end of the 2000s, twenty-six sovereign issuers in Latin 
America and the Caribbean were rated.
The evolution of credit ratings closely followed the region’s business 
cycle. During the financial shocks of the second half of the 1990s, many 
countries in the region were downgraded, but there was a trend towards 
improved credit quality in the 2000s, especially after 2003 (see figure VI.1). 
By the end of the period, many countries in the region had received an 
investment-grade rating.
For South America and Mexico, credit quality has recorded an upward 
trend for a few years now, with upgrades outpacing downgrades on a yearly 
basis. The upgrade cycle was momentarily interrupted during the global 
financial crisis, but the positive trend soon returned. Lower financing needs 
on the part of the countries, good economic policies, including improvement 
in key vulnerability indicators, and strong economic growth have led to a 
steady and continued trend of credit upgrades in the region. 
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Figure vi.1 
the evolUtion oF Credit ratings in latin ameriCa and the Caribbean









































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. 
Note:
South America: Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. 
Latin America and the Caribbean: South America and Mexico, plus Central America (Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) and the Caribbean (Barbados, Belize, Dominican 
Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago).
Investment grade: BBB–/Baa3 and above. Sovereign ratings were converted to numerical values (see 
table VI.2 at the end of the section) and averaged across the three CRAs (Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s).
Overall, credit ratings for the Caribbean and Central American 
countries have not followed the same trajectory as the rest of the Latin 
American region. While credit ratings for South America and Mexico suffered 
a negative impact during the global financial crisis, they have already 
recovered and have been on an upward trend since then. The majority of the 
countries in the Caribbean also suffered downgrades following the onset of 
the 2008 financial crisis, but so far they have not recovered their previous 
standing. This reflects their more sluggish post-crisis recovery relative to 
the rest of the region (see figure VI.2). The Caribbean downgrades were 
based on credit weakness and fiscal deterioration, as financial instability 
stemming from the global financial crisis weighed heavily on the Caribbean 
countries’ fiscal accounts.
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Figure vi.2 























and Mexico Central America The Caribbean
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of data from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. 
Note:
South America: Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. 
Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
The Caribbean: Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
Investment grade: BBB–/Baa3 and above.
The current outlook for sovereign ratings provides a prospective 
indication of the agencies’ credit views on the countries of the region. By 
the end of 2011, twelve of the rated sovereign issuers in the region had a 
positive outlook from one or more of the three main CRAs (Fitch, Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s), and only two had a negative outlook. By the end 
of 2012, there were six countries with a positive outlook, despite the series 
of upgrades that took place in 2012 and previous years. This suggests that, 
at the end of 2012, the recent trend towards improving credit quality had 
not reached an end just yet. However, the number of countries with a 
negative outlook had increased to seven (with four in the Caribbean, one 
in Central America and two in South America). 
The leading credit rating agencies have warned that, after so many 
years of improvement in credit ratings, it will be a difficult challenge for 
countries in the region to achieve higher credit ratings from now on, unless 
they address institutional problems. According to Moody’s, while rating 
upgrades in previous years were largely driven by increased resilience to 
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external shocks, improved government debt profiles and strong economic 
performances, further upgrades for countries already in the investment grade 
category will depend on the strengthening of institutions in general, with 
particular attention being focused on credible institutional arrangements 
that reinforce fiscal management.
The list of investment-grade countries in the region increased from 
four in 2002 (Barbados, Chile, Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago) to nine 
by the end of 2012 (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay).2 Investment-grade status 
reduces financing costs significantly by improving market expectations 
and encouraging greater inflows from a broader and more diversified 
investor base. Reaching investment grade can lower sovereign spreads 
significantly (Jaramillo and Tejada, 2011). 
There is a negative relationship between credit ratings and the 
level of spreads. Sovereigns with better credit ratings usually have lower 
spreads than sovereigns with worse credit ratings, as illustrated by the 
exponential trend line shown in figure VI.3. The figure shows that the 
number of investment-grade countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
increased significantly in the 2000s. It also shows that spreads tend to 
increase substantially for countries with speculative credit ratings.3 By 
the end of 2002, Argentina’s average spreads reached 6,342 basis points 
following its downgrade to selective default by Standard & Poor’s4 and 
restricted default by Fitch. Because of its high bond spreads, Argentina was 
removed from the 2002 sample in figure VI.3. In addition, more countries 
are included in the 2012 sample, as JP Morgan added Belize and Jamaica 
to its EMBIG index in 2007. 
2 Colombia and Uruguay kept an investment grade from all three agencies for a period of 
time before 2002: from September 1995 to August 1999 in the case of Colombia, and from 
June 1997 to February 2002 in the case of Uruguay.
3 The terms investment grade and speculative grade are shorthand for the categories AAA 
to BBB (investment grade) and BB to D (speculative grade). Investment-grade categories 
indicate relatively low to moderate credit risk, while ratings in the speculative range signal 
either a higher level of credit risk or a recent default.
4 A selective default (SD) rating is assigned when Standard & Poor’s believes that while the 
obligor has selectively defaulted on a specific issue or class of obligations, it will continue 
to meet its payment obligations on other issues or classes of obligations in a timely manner.
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Figure vi.3 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: sovereign Credit  
ratings and spreads in 2002 and 2012
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
Fitch, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and JP Morgan.
Note: The horizontal axis corresponds to average sovereign credit ratings; the vertical axis shows EMBIG 
spreads in basis points. The vertical line indicates the investment-grade threshold. Two of the four 
investment grade countries in 2002 —Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago— and two of the nine investment 
grade countries in 2012 —Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago— are not included in the EMBIG index; 
accordingly, they do not figure in the charts.
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The gap in credit quality between emerging and developed markets 
has been narrowing as credit quality improves in emerging economies 
and deteriorates in developed countries. The upgrades that took place in 
the region in 2011 and 2012 contrast with the situation in Europe and the 
United States. For example, in 2011 the United States faced the first-ever 
downgrade of its credit rating, while Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
all raised their foreign- and local-currency ratings for Brazil to a higher 
investment-grade category to reflect the government’s strong finances. 
In the region, there were eight countries in the triple-B investment-grade 
space at the end of 2012: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. Italy and Spain fell into the same 
category, as the deepening European crisis resulted in a wave of sovereign 
ratings downgrades in developed markets in 2012. Chile, the ninth Latin 
American investment-grade country, had even higher credit ratings at the 
end of 2012: Aa3, AA– and A+.
The situation following the global financial crisis contrasts with the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. Back then, with credit ratings deteriorating, 
emerging market countries voiced significant doubts about the credit 
rating process and the usefulness of sovereign credit ratings in particular. 
They argued that the improvements in sovereign credit ratings in the first 
half of the 1990s and the sharp declines later in the decade inserted a 
procyclical element into global capital flows by accelerating capital inflows 
in the mid-1990s and contributing to their collapse after the Asian crisis 
emerged. Some studies on the role of credit rating agencies in this period 
suggested that the agencies had a substantial influence on the size and 
volatility of lending to emerging markets (see Kräussl, 2003).
The roles reversed in the past few years, and advanced economies 
were the ones raising questions regarding the role and usefulness of the 
credit rating process. Frustration with the role of credit rating agencies 
escalated following the global financial crisis and the fiscal crisis in the 
euro zone. It can be expected that there will be increased scrutiny of 
credit rating actions going forward, as advanced economies implement 
regulatory reforms and work to reduce the possibility of a recurrence of 
the global financial crisis. 
In the past, rating agencies were criticized for reacting to market events 
rather than leading. Now they are trying to pre-empt economic events in 
an attempt to re-establish their credibility after the global financial crisis, 
during which the top rating agencies failed to spot the liquidity problems 
facing big banks around the world. In the next section, we examine the 
relationship between credit ratings and spreads and whether credit rating 
agencies lag (or lead) the markets when assigning risk. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fitch score moody's score s&p score
Upper investment 
grade
aaa 22 aaa 22 aaa 22
aa+ 21 aa1 21 aa+ 21
aa 20 aa2 20 aa 20
aa- 19 aa3 19 aa- 19
a+ 18 a1 18 a+ 18
a 17 a2 17 a 17
a- 16 a3 16 a- 16
lower investment 
grade
bbb+ 15 baa1 15 bbb+ 15
bbb 14 baa2 14 bbb 14
bbb- 13 baa3 13 bbb- 13
non-investment 
grade
bb+ 12 ba1 12 bb+ 12
bb 11 ba2 11 bb 11
bb- 10 ba3 10 bb- 10
lower non-
investment grade
b+ 9 b1 9 b+ 9
b 8 b2 8 b 8
b- 7 b3 7 b- 7
CCC+ 6 Caa1 6 CCC+ 6
CCC 5 Caa2 5 CCC 5
CCC- 4 Caa3 4 CCC- 4
CC 3 Ca 3 CC 3
C 2 C 2 C 2
default rd 1 1 sd 1
d 0 0 d 0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of ratings from 
Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.
B. Sovereign credit ratings and their impact  
on spreads 
Trends in Latin American credit ratings roughly matched the business cycle 
in the 1990s, falling during the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, rising in 1995-
1997 and falling sharply in 1998 and 1999. A similar pattern occurred in 
the 2000s as well, when credit ratings improved substantially during the 
boom years between 2003 and 2007, momentarily worsened during the 
global financial crisis and then resumed a positive trend (see figure VI.1 in 
the previous section).
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Credit ratings and spreads have a negative relationship. When a 
country’s creditworthiness improves, the country risk as measured by debt 
spreads is expected to decline; if a country’s creditworthiness deteriorates, 
country risk as measured by debt spreads is expected to rise. However, the 
causality of this inverse relationship is hard to determine. Does the behaviour 
of debt spreads respond to changes in credit ratings, or do credit ratings 
respond to changes in spreads? Do the credit rating agencies take action in 
response to spreads that become excessively low or high?
Gaillard (2009) analyses the interactions between JP Morgan EMBIG 
spreads and Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s sovereign ratings from 
December 1993 to February 2007. Using an unbalanced panel data estimation, 
the author finds that beyond the obvious negative relationship between 
spreads and ratings, Moody’s disagrees with the market more often than Fitch 
and Standard & Poor’s. The results show that credit ratings are very stable 
overall: 87% of ratings (average of the three agencies) remain unchanged one 
month after spreads post excessively high or low levels, and 77% of ratings 
are still unchanged after three months. He also finds that rating changes are 
asymmetric, in that the agencies are more reluctant to upgrade when spreads 
are excessively low than to downgrade when spreads are excessively high.
Figure vi.4 
embig spreads beFore and aFter a downgrade  
to seleCtive deFaUlt by s&p













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of data from Standard & Poor’s and JP Morgan EMBIG.
Note: The countries in the sample are Argentina (selective default announcement date: 6 November 2001), 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (18 January 2005), Dominican Republic 
(1 February 2005), Ecuador (15 December 2008), Jamaica (14 January 2010) and Uruguay (16 May 2003).
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Figure vi.5 
embig spreads beFore and aFter an Upgrade 
to investment grade by s&p
(Spreads measured in basis points one, three and five months before and after) 










Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
Standard & Poor’s and JP Morgan EMBIG.
Note: The countries in the sample are Brazil (investment-grade rating announcement: 20 April 2008), 
Colombia (16 March 2011), Mexico (7 February 2002), Panama (25 May 2010) and Peru (14 July 2008).
Figures VI.4 and VI.5 summarize the behaviour of JP Morgan EMBIG 
spreads during six S&P downgrades to selective default (SD) and six S&P 
upgrades to investment grade (IG) in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 
three of the six downgrades, spreads were already moving in the direction 
of the rating change three months prior to their announcement, suggesting 
that the credit rating agency lagged the market in its response in those cases. 
In the case of the upgrades to investment grade, spreads were 
already moving in the direction of the rating change three months prior to 
their announcement in two cases. One month before the announcement, 
spreads began moving in the direction of the rating change in four of the 
six upgrades (table VI.3). After the downgrades were announced, however, 
spreads moved in the expected direction (up) in only one of the six cases. In 
the case of the upgrades, spreads moved in the expected direction (down) 
in five of the six upgrades one month after the announcement and in two 
of the six three months after.
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table vi.3 
standard & poor’s downgrades to seleCtive deFaUlt  
and Upgrades to investment grade
november 2001 - april 2012
(a) was the market already moving in the direction suggested by s&p's downgrade to sd
before it was announced?
y n not conclusive
3 months 3 3 -
1 month 3 3 -
(b) did the market move in the expected direction after the agency's announcement?
y n not conclusive
1 month 1 4 1
3 months 1 5 -
(a) was the market already moving in the direction suggested by s&p's upgrade to ig
before it was announced?
y n not conclusive
3 months 2 4 -
1 month 4 2 -
(b) did the market move in the expected direction after the agency's announcement?
y n not conclusive
1 month 5 1 -
3 months 2 4 -
summary of 12 actions
(a) was the market already moving in the direction suggested by s&p's announcements
before it was announced?
y n not conclusive
3 months 5 7 -
1 month 7 5 -
(b) did the market move in the expected direction after s&p's announcement?
y n not conclusive
1 month 6 5 1
3 months 3 9 -
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information 
from Standard & Poor’s announcements and JP Morgan EMBIG spreads.
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The two cases in which the agency seems to have led the market are the 
case of Argentina’s downgrade to selective default in November 2001 and the 
upgrade of Panama to investment grade in May 2010. In the first case, spreads 
continued to go up within one, three and five months of the downgrade; in 
the second, spreads continued to fall within one, three and five months of 
the upgrade. In other cases, when the market moved in the direction of the 
change, either spreads changed direction within a month and were already 
going in the opposite direction of the change three months later, or they 
did not respond within the first month of change, but only after a lag. It is 
therefore hard to determine whether the cause of the change was the credit 
rating announcement or some other factor. 
Whether Latin American spreads changed their trend before or after 
an announcement may suggest whether credit rating agencies were leading 
the markets in pricing risk or just following the region’s business cycle and 
not adding more information than the market actually had prior to the 
announcement. Overall, credit rating agencies did not seem to add more 
information than the market actually had prior to the change in ratings in 
the 12 cases examined. Spreads were already moving in the direction the 
change in rating would have suggested in 42% of the cases three months 
prior to the announcement and in 58% of the cases one month before. Spreads 
actually moved in the opposite direction one month after the announcement 
in more than 42% of the cases and in 75% of the cases three months after. 
This is not a comprehensive exercise, of course, since we have selected 
just a few specific actions and a few countries and have examined the actions 
of only one of the credit rating agencies. Other factors may be playing a role 
in the changes in spreads and credit ratings. However, it serves to illustrate 
that although credit ratings and spreads are interdependent, as Gaillard (2009) 
concludes in his paper, their movements are not necessarily synchronized.
 Chapter VII
Unequal access: a closer look at Central 
America and the Caribbean
Access to international capital markets and flows of private capital towards 
Latin America and the Caribbean increased significantly in the past twenty 
years, as discussed in the previous chapters. However, not all countries 
have borrowed as frequently or on the same terms as some of the larger 
economies. For the most part, access to international capital markets is more 
limited and costly for some Central American and Caribbean countries 
than for other countries in Latin America, as they face peculiar constraints 
in attracting global capital. Their small size, which implies a narrow range 
of economic activities and limited economies of scale, and vulnerability to 
economic shocks are among the factors that impair access. 
Vulnerability tends to increase during periods of external shocks 
and financial turbulence. During the 2008 global financial crisis and more 
recent bouts of volatility, some Central American and Caribbean countries 
seem to have felt a stronger impact than the rest of the region, with larger 
increases in their sovereign debt spreads and sharper downgrades in their 
credit risk ratings. 
The financial turmoil in developed markets led investors to liquidate 
their holdings of Latin American and Caribbean assets in 2008, causing 
borrowing costs for governments in the region to surge to levels unseen in 
the previous six years. The region felt the collapse of global financial markets 
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through a slowdown in capital inflows, large declines in stock price indexes, 
significant currency adjustments and increased debt spreads. 
In contrast to past downturns, however, Latin America and the 
Caribbean showed increased resilience and posted a robust recovery. 
The Latin component of the JP Morgan EMBIG index rose sharply from 
mid-September to the end of 2008, but it then embarked on a declining 
trend, only increasing during periods of higher volatility (see figure VII.1). 
New international debt issuance in the region picked up in the first quarter 
of 2009, following a lull in the second half of 2008, and it has continued to 
be active since then (see figure VII.2).
Figure vii.1 
Jp morgan embig and Cboe volatility index: 2007-2012 



























































































Latin EMBIGEMBIGVIX CLose AVG CA+CARIBBEAN
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) and from the Chicago Board Options Exchange [online] 
(www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx).
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Figure vii.2 
latin ameriCa and the Caribbean: 










































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
The post-crisis recovery in Central America and the Caribbean seems 
lackluster relative to the recovery of the region as a whole, however. Their 
average spreads measured by the EMBIG increased more sharply during 
the crisis, and the gap relative to average spreads for the region as a whole 
continued in the post-crisis period and actually widened from September 
2011 to December 2012 (figure VII.1). In addition, their credit risk rating 
suffered a stronger negative impact, and their new debt issuance as a share 
of the region’s total issuance had not yet recovered by the end of 2012. 
The following sections focus on the trajectory of bond spreads and 
issuance, as well as credit quality, during the 2008 global financial crisis 
and in the post-crisis period. The behaviour of bond spreads and new 
debt issuance in the period supports the notion that access to international 
bond markets for small, vulnerable economies tends to be more sporadic 
and more costly than for larger economies. Countries in Central America 
and the Caribbean were hit harder during the crisis, and they had not yet 
regained their pre-crisis standings by the end of 2012. 
The trend towards financial openness gained renewed impetus 
in the 1990s. It was widespread and seen in all subregions, although it 
was less intense in the Caribbean. Using the Chinn-Ito index of financial 
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openness, ECLAC (2012) shows that for the region as a whole, the index 
had surpassed the levels seen in the 1970s by the mid-1990s, but financial 
openness in the Caribbean did not return to the 1970s levels until the 2000s. 
By the late 2000s the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean had 
achieved the highest degree of financial-account openness of all developing 
economies, and in Central America and the Dominican Republic the indices 
were close to those of developed economies. Growing financial openness 
was accompanied by an increase in foreign-currency assets in the region, 
which grew to represent 18% of GDP in South America, 15% in Central 
America and Mexico and 17% in the Caribbean.1 
Bonds were among those foreign-currency assets. In terms of size, total 
bond issuances in 2003-2011 represented 5% of GDP in the Caribbean, on 
average, 4% in Central America and 2% in South America and Mexico. As a 
share of total international reserves during the same period, bond issuances 
represented more than 50% of international reserves in the Caribbean, on 
average, 37% in Central America and 14% in South America and Mexico.2
A. New debt issuance
The volume of international bond issuance in Latin America and the Caribbean 
rose considerably in the past decade, from US$ 40 billion in 2000 to a record 
US$ 114.5 billion in 2012. Despite the record issues in the region since 2009, 
debt issuance by the Central American and Caribbean countries as a share 
of the regional total had not yet recovered from the global financial crisis 
by the end of 2012 (see figure VII.3). In 2010 and 2011, this share reached its 
lowest level since 2000, offering further evidence that the small economies of 
the region were struggling to return to pre-crisis levels. The share increased 
slightly in 2012. 
1 See ECLAC (2012, Chapter III, p. 106). 
2 Data include sovereign and corporate issues (see table IV.1 in chapter IV). Caribbean 
countries that issued debt in international bond markets in 2003-2011 include Bahamas, 
Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Central American 
countries include Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. South 
American countries include Argentina, The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. South America 
and Mexico are grouped together.
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FigUre vii.3 
Central ameriCan and Caribbean issUanCe as a share  



















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
Issuance by Central American and Caribbean countries represented 
about 7% of the region’s total in 2000-2012, totaling US$ 46 billion. The 
biggest issuer was Panama, which issued a total of US$ 12 billion and 
accounted for 27% of the total Central America and Caribbean issuance (see 
figures VII.4 and VII.5). Panama was followed by Jamaica, with US$ 11 billion 
and 24% of the total; El Salvador, with US$ 6 billion and 14% of the total; the 
Dominican Republic, with US$ 5 billion and 11% of the total; Costa Rica, with 
US$ 3 billion and 7% of the total; and Trinidad and Tobago, with US$ 2.8 billion 
and 6% of the total. Together, those top six issuers accounted for almost 90% 
of total debt issuance —including both sovereign and corporate debt— in 
Central America and the Caribbean.
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FigUre vii.4 























































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
One of the debt financing trends in the past decade, as described in 
previous chapters, was a shift in external funding from sovereign to corporate 
and bank debt. Central American and Caribbean countries have mirrored this 
trend, with the share of corporate bond issuance increasing after 2004 (with 
the exception of 2008, the onset of the global financial crisis). After increasing 
in 2009, however, corporate and total debt issuance declined again in 2010 and 
remained low in 2011, as countries faced a challenging growth environment 
in the post-crisis period. The global crisis intensified the fiscal imbalances 
already present in several of those countries, as governments sought to 
stabilize national economies through fiscal stimulus packages that led to 
the expansion of public expenditures in excess of revenue growth. The rest 
of the region recorded the opposite trend, with corporate and total issuance 
increasing sharply in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, issuance in Central America 
and the Caribbean followed the pattern of the rest of the region, showing 
an increase in both corporate and total new debt issuance.
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FigUre vii.5 
Central ameriCan and Caribbean issUanCe: CoUntry shares, 2000-2012
(Percentages)
























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
In 2007, corporate issuance in Central America and the Caribbean 
amounted to 65% of total issuance, surpassing sovereign issuance for the 
first time. The trend towards a higher share of corporate issuance was 
interrupted by the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. After a drastic drop 
in both corporate and total issuance in 2008, the share of corporate issuance 
resumed its climb. In 2010 corporate issuance again surpassed sovereign 
issuance, peaking at an unprecedented 68% of the total (see figure VII.6). The 
trend was interrupted again in 2011, with the external context deteriorating 
drastically in the second half of the year and the corporate share falling 
to 35%. It recovered in 2012, reaching 64% of the total.
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FigUre vii.6 
Central ameriCa and the Caribbean: sovereign and Corporate  
debt issUanCe, 2000-2012



















































Sovereign US$ billion (left scale) Corporate US$ billion (left scale) Corporate share
percentage (right scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
LatinFinance, JP Morgan and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.
B. Sovereign debt spreads
Following the collapse of financial markets in September 2008, the Latin 
American spreads, measured by the EMBIG, widened by 238 basis points 
between September and October 2008, but the economies of Central America 
and the Caribbean experienced a much stronger impact. On average, EMBIG 
spreads for these countries (excluding Panama) widened by 433 basis points, 
almost twice the Latin average.
The Latin component widened 423 basis points from the end of 
August to the end of November 2008, versus 571 basis points for Central 
America and the Caribbean and 628 basis points for the Caribbean alone. 
Since then it has tightened by 439 basis points, from 765 basis points at the 
end of November 2008 to 326 basis points at the end of December 2012, more 
than recovering from the widening suffered during the crisis. In contrast, 
spreads tightened 218 basis points for Central America and the Caribbean 
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during the same period and only 14 basis points for the Caribbean alone.3 
While spreads had already recovered for the region as a whole by the end 
of 2012, in the case of Central America and Caribbean, spreads were far from 
recovering and have yet to regain their pre-crisis levels.
Spreads widened sharply following the onset of the crisis in September 2008, 
but they peaked by the beginning of 2009 (see figure VII.7). In the second half 
of 2009 and over the course of 2010, Central America and Caribbean saw 
their spreads tighten towards pre-crisis levels, thus closing some of the gap 
with the rest of the region. They widened more than the regional average 
in 2011 and 2012, however, and the gap opened again. Many Caribbean countries 
face significant challenges as they struggle with very high debt-to-GDP ratios 
in economies battered by natural disasters and a slump in tourism.
FigUre vii.7 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
JP Morgan. 
Note: The Caribbean average includes Belize, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
(data for Trinidad and Tobago are available only from June 2007 to March 2009). The average for Central 
America and the Caribbean includes the previous countries plus El Salvador and Panama.
3 The average spread for Central America and the Caribbean based on JP Morgan EMBIG 
spreads include Belize, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica, Panama and Trinidad 
and Tobago (spreads for Trinidad and Tobago were available only until March 2009). The 
Caribbean average includes Belize, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
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Spreads for Belize widened 774 basis points in 2011 —the biggest 
increase by far among all the Central American and Caribbean countries in 
the sample. In addition, spreads increased 275 basis points for the Dominican 
Republic, 210 basis points for Jamaica, 176 basis points for El Salvador and 39 basis 
points for Panama. The Latin component widened 111 basis points in 2011. 
In 2012, spreads tightened by 142 basis points in Latin America as a 
whole. In contrast, spreads widened by 225 basis points for the Caribbean 
region and by 104 basis points for Central America and the Caribbean 
combined. While spreads tightened in 2012 for the Dominican Republic 
(–254 basis points), El Salvador (–82), and Panama (–72), they widened 
by 854 points for Belize and by 74 basis points for Jamaica (see figure VII.8). 
FigUre vii.8 
embig and latin Composite: Central ameriCan and Caribbean  


















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
JP Morgan.
The increase in Belize’s spread reflects the restructuring of its 
US$ 547 million 2029 super bond. On 20 September 2012, after the expiration 
of the 30-day grace period of a US$ 23.1 million coupon payment on 
Belize’s 2029 bond that was scheduled for August 20, the government 
announced that it would make a partial payment of US$ 11.6 million, roughly 
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half of the interest owed to bondholders. The Coordinating Committee of 
Belize Bondholders described the government’s announcement as a step 
in the right direction and agreed not to seek legal remedies for 60 days 
in order to provide enough time for the two sides to finalize negotiations 
on the debt restructuring process. Negotiations began on 2 October, and 
an exchange offer was made on 15 February 2013. On 8 March 2013, the 
government announced that the holders of 86.17% of the country’s United 
States dollar bonds due in 2029 had decided to participate in the restructuring 
and exchange their bonds for new United States dollar bonds due in 2038.
In the case of Jamaica, the economy was marked by high deficits, a 
large public debt burden and challenging foreign exchange reserves, while 
facing a tough global economy. The concomitant uncertainty translated into 
higher spreads, which remained above the regional average at the end of 2012. 
The government has renegotiatied an agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (a 48-month, US$ 932 million extended arrangement), which 
was approved by the Fund’s Executive Board on 1 May 2013.
The other countries in the EMBIG are the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador and Panama, whose spreads tightened in 2012. With an IMF 
agreement in place, Dominican Republic bonds have been increasingly 
viewed in a more positive light by markets, after a default and a banking 
crisis in May 2003 led to a general loss of confidence on the part of investors. 
Its spreads are close to the Latin American regional average and, for the 
most part, have followed global conditions.
El Salvador’s spreads had been broadly following the regional average, 
but in 2011 the sovereign was downgraded by S&P and Moody’s. The agencies 
cited the high debt-to-GDP ratio, the high level of non-performing bank 
loans and the growing political uncertainty as reasons for the downgrades. 
Spreads tightened in 2012, however, and were at 396 basis points at the end 
of December 2012, versus 326 basis points for the Latin EMBIG. 
Panama received an investment grade in 2010 and performed better 
than the regional average in the past two years. At year-end 2012, it had 
one of the lower spreads in the Latin EMBIG composite, at 129 basis points.
C. Evolution of credit ratings 
In parallel with the increase in EMBIG spreads, Central American and 
Caribbean countries experienced downgrades in their credit risk rating 
during the crisis, and at the end of 2012 many of them had yet to regain 
their previous rating. Because of the small size and underdeveloped capital 
markets in many of their economies, credit ratings can potentially play an 
important role in investors’ decisions towards the region. Together, the three 
120 ECLAC
main credit rating agencies —Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s— provide 
ratings for about fifteen countries in Central America and the Caribbean, 
but the analysis that follows focuses on the twelve countries rated by at least 
two of the agencies.
Overall, credit ratings for the Caribbean and Central American countries 
did not follow the same trajectory as the rest of the region, as discussed 
earlier. While credit ratings for South America and Mexico were negatively 
affected by the global financial crisis, they recovered quickly and were soon 
on an upward trend. In contrast, at the end of 2012 a majority of the countries 
in the Caribbean had still to recover from the 2008 downgrades. This is the 
case of the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize and Jamaica. In these four cases, the 
downgrades reflected credit weakness and fiscal deterioration, as financial 
instability brought about by the global financial crisis weighed heavily on the 
countries’ fiscal accounts. In the case of the Dominican Republic, ratings were 
downgraded by Standard & Poor’s in the immediate aftermath of the crisis 
but had recovered by the end of 2012, while Trinidad and Tobago’s ratings 
remained unchanged throughout the period and Suriname’s actually improved.
Figure vii.9 
































Central America The Caribbean
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. 
Note:
South America: Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. 
Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
The Caribbean: Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
Investment grade: BBB–/Baa3 and above. 
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 The Bahamas held an investment grade of A–/A3 by Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s prior to the crisis. In November 2008, Standard & Poor’s 
revised its rating outlook to negative, stating that the United States economic 
downturn had severely affected the Bahamian economy, which depends 
heavily on the United States for investment, trade and tourism. The rating 
was then downgraded in December 2009 to BBB+ and in October 2011 to 
BBB, a lower investment grade. The outlook on the BBB rating was revised 
to negative from stable in September 2012 because of a deteriorating fiscal 
profile. The Bahamas thus had yet to recover its previous rating at the 
year-end 2012. According to Standard & Poor’s, “the Bahamian economy 
is vulnerable to the country’s dependence on one sector, tourism, and one 
geographic market, the United States.” In August 2011, Moody’s revised the 
outlook to negative, saying that the central government debt has increased 
by almost 150% over the past decade to nearly 50% of GDP at year-end 2010, 
with over 40% of the increase occurring in the previous two years alone. 
Barbados held an investment grade of BBB/Baa2 by Standard & Poor’s 
and Moody’s prior to the crisis. The sovereign was downgraded one notch 
by Moody’s in October 2009 and by Standard & Poor’s in October 2010, and 
it lost its investment-grade status from both agencies in 2012. The main 
reasons given for the downgrades were the deterioration and weakening 
of the country’s fiscal profile and key debt indicators, as well as weakening 
economic fundamentals, stemming, according to Standard & Poor’s, from 
rising competitive challenges and other structural factors that the government 
can address only in the long-term. 
Belize held a non-investment-grade rating of B by Standard & Poor’s 
and B3 by Moody’s (one notch lower than Standard & Poor’s) prior to the 
crisis. The sovereign was downgraded one notch lower to B– by Standard & 
Poor’s in August 2011, bringing the ratings of both agencies to the same level. 
The lowered rating reflected Belize’s higher fiscal deficit and rising contingent 
liabilities, which, in Standard & Poor’s view, reduced its fiscal flexibility. In 
February 2012, the two agencies downgraded the sovereign to CCC+ and 
Caa1, respectively, citing concerns about a possible debt restructuring. In 
June 2012, Moody’s downgraded Belize’s long-term ratings further to Ca from 
Caa1, with a developing outlook. The downgrade reflected concerns about 
the country’s external debt and weakened growth prospects. In August 2012, 
Standard & Poor’s downgraded Belize’s foreign currency sovereign credit 
ratings to selective default, following the government’s announcement that 
it would not pay the US$ 23 million semi-annual interest coupon on its 
US$ 547 million 2029 bond, which was due on 20 August 2012.
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Prior to the crisis, Jamaica held a non-investment-grade rating of 
B1 by Moody’s, B+ by Fitch and B (one notch lower than the other agencies) 
by Standard & Poor’s. The sovereign’s rating was immediately affected by 
the global crisis, with the three agencies changing the outlook to negative 
and proceeding to further downgrade the sovereign. The agencies indicated 
that shocks from global financial turbulence and the expected United States 
recession had heightened downside credit risks, given Jamaica’s reliance on 
external funding for its comparatively high fiscal and external deficits. The 
sovereign was downgraded further in 2009. In 2010, however, Jamaica was 
upgraded by all three agencies after the successful outcome of a domestic debt 
exchange and the approval of a US$ 1.27 billion IMF Stand-By Arrangement, 
which mitigated near-term external liquidity concerns. Jamaica had not yet 
recovered its previous ratings by the end of 2012, which were two-notches 
lower than before the crisis.
 The Dominican Republic held a non-investment-grade rating of B+ by 
Standard & Poor’s and B2 and B by Moody’s and Fitch (one notch lower than 
Standard & Poor’s). The sovereign was downgraded to B by Standard & Poor’s 
in December 2008, bringing the rating on par with the other two agencies. 
Moody’s upgraded the rating to B1 in 2010 to reflect a reassessment of the 
country’s overall credit resilience after the global financial crisis, Standard 
& Poor’s brought its rating back to B+ in June 2011, reflecting the country’s 
progress in gradually improving its debt structure and debt management, 
advancing structural reforms and improving policymaking transparency.
Suriname was upgraded from B+ prior to the crisis to BB– in 
August 2011 by Standard & Poor’s and from B to B+ in July 2011 by Fitch. The 
changes reflected improving macroeconomic fundamentals, good medium-
term growth prospects and a low debt position. In July 2012 Suriname’s 
rating was upgraded further by Fitch, from B+ toto BB–, with the agency 
citing government action to minimize fiscal imbalances while maintaining 
price and exchange rate stability as the reason. In August 2012, Moody’s also 
upgraded Suriname to Ba3 from B1, with a positive outlook. The upgrade 
reflected prudent fiscal management, as well as robust growth, driven by the 
gold mining, petroleum and construction sectors. It was also supported by 
the country’s ability to attract significant foreign investment in the extractive 
industries and offshore exploration.
Suriname is among the Caribbean’s top commodity producers and 
exporters. Together with Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Belize (despite 
its debt restructuring), it benefited from higher commodity prices, showing 
more fiscal space and a more manageable debt burden than other countries 
in the region during the global financial crisis and in the post-crisis period. 
Suriname and Guyana benefited from high prices for gold and minerals and 
Trinidad and Tobago from high prices for oil and natural gas. 
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In Central America, Honduras and El Salvador suffered downgrades 
following the global financial crisis. Honduras recovered its pre-crisis 
standing in June 2012, but El Salvador had not yet recovered its standing 
by the end of 2012. 
Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama saw their ratings improve since 
the 2008 global financial crisis. Panama was upgraded by the three agencies 
to investment grade in 2010. It was upgraded further in July 2012 by Standard 
& Poor’s (to BBB) and in October 2012 by Moody’s (to Baa2 from Baa3), due 
to its ongoing economic dynamism, positive medium-term growth and 
continuing improvements in its debt metrics. Panama followed the trend 
of the rest of Latin America. Costa Rica also received an investment grade 
in 2010 by Moody’s, but Standard & Poor’s and Fitch still retained the non-
investment-grade rating at year-end 2012. 
El Salvador was downgraded by Fitch in June 2009 from BB+ to BB, 
to reflect what the agency considered a structural shift in the country’s 
fiscal and growth trajectory. Moody’s downgraded the sovereign from an 
investment-grade rating prior to the crisis (Baa3) to a non-investment-grade 
rating of Ba1 in November 2009. In March 2011, Moody’s downgraded the 
sovereign rating once again. Among the factors cited for the downgrade 
were El Salvador’s high debt-to-GDP ratio, high level of non-performing 
bank loans and weak economic growth. These are the same issues that have 
weighed down many of the Central American and Caribbean economies.
The evolution of credit ratings, debt issuance and debt spreads for 
many countries of the Central American and Caribbean region suggests 
that the advantage conferred by their openness, export-driven growth and 
linkages to developed countries can soon become a disadvantage with the 
onset of a global shock that originates in these same advanced economies. A 
potential explanation for why so many of these economies were so hard hit 
by the 2008 global financial crisis is their sensitivity to the economic cycle of 
advanced countries, particularly the United States. In addition, during the 
recovery phase, the weak linkages with the emerging countries that were 
driving the global recovery, such as China and India, prevented them from 
enjoying a stronger performance.
Many countries are still constrained by high levels of debt as a share 
of GDP and have limited fiscal space, which can slow down their policy 
response during economic downturns. Most of the credit rating downgrades 
that took place in the aftermath of the global financial crisis were motivated 
by fiscal deterioration, as financial instability brought about by the global 
financial crisis weighed heavily on the countries’ fiscal accounts. 
For the most part, Central American and Caribbean countries’ access 
to private international capital markets was more costly and limited during 
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and after the global financial crisis than it was for many of the larger 
economies of Latin America. This underscores the importance of keeping 
financing from multilateral sources available. Multilateral development 
banks and bilateral aid agencies must remain fully cognizant of countries’ 
vulnerability to shocks. The system of international cooperation should 
search for a comprehensive and broad-based response to the development 
challenge, one that considers Latin American and Caribbean economies’ 
diverse needs, given that access to private international capital markets 
is not homogeneous and borrowing terms can be more or less favourable 
depending on the borrower. 
Finally, financial stability and integration is integral to economic 
growth and development. The development agenda for the region should take 
into account the vulnerabilities of many Central American and Caribbean 
countries, their small size and sensitivity to global economic downturns. 
The ideal strategy will take into consideration the unique constraints and 
strengths of each of these countries to best fit their particular needs.
Chapter VIII
Looking ahead: are emerging and developed 
debt markets converging?
Emerging market debt as an asset class has evolved in the past three decades, 
and the borderline between emerging market debt and developed market 
debt has been blurring over time as a result. In the past few decades, most 
investors operated on the basis that developed market debt was safe and 
predictable, that key variables could be factored into a spread sheet to calculate 
risks and returns. When investors analysed risk in emerging markets, they 
paid close attention to political risk and social challenges, variables that 
could not be factored into a spread sheet. The 2008 global financial crisis 
and the recent turmoil in the euro zone have left many investors confused, 
however. Social concerns are suddenly becoming crucial to the developed 
world as well, bringing questions of trust and social cohesion to the fore 
when calculating developed markets’ risk. 
In 2006 and 2007, the top two variables that best explained sovereign 
spread differences across a large pool of developed and emerging market 
countries, according to Credit Suisse (2011), were GDP per capita and 
inflation. The debt of emerging market countries (which tend to have 
lower GDP per capita than developed countries) systematically traded at 
higher yields than the debt of developed countries during those years. The 
bigger the income differential, the larger the yield differential. In 2008, 
however, GDP per capital dropped out of the top two spots and has not 
made it back since then. 
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The two macroeconomic variables that best explained sovereign 
spread differences across developed and emerging market countries by 
the end of 2011 according to Credit Suisse were inflation and external debt. 
This change probably reflects improvements in emerging markets’ fiscal 
situation and external indebtedness. Moreover, the implementation of 
massively expansionary fiscal and monetary policy by developed countries 
in response to the 2008 global financial crisis has challenged the notion that 
emerging market countries are more prone to abrupt risky policy shifts than 
developed countries. 
The expansionary central bank policies in the advanced economies 
implemented in response to the global financial crisis produced an unprecedented 
policy environment and created ample liquidity in international capital 
markets between 2009 and 2012. Flows into Latin American bonds increased 
considerably as a result. Several firms in the region made their debut in 
international bond markets during this period, and higher-yield issuance 
grew. Latin American and Caribbean debt capital market volumes topped 
US$ 100 billion in 2012, a historical record, as private investors perceived 
many of the region’s corporate and sovereign issuers as a flight-to-quality 
trade, given their net external credit position and strong balance sheets.
Structural changes have also played an important role in attracting 
capital inflows. Most countries in the region have become less prone to 
systemic crises over the past decade. Moreover, with so many countries in 
the region carrying investment-grade ratings, Latin American bonds have 
become an investment option for large institutional investors in advanced 
economies, such as pension funds and insurance companies. The region’s 
larger and more diversified investor base, which has more investors willing 
to hold assets for the long term, has contributed to the increase in bond flows 
towards the region and, to a certain extent, made them more stable than 
they were in the 1990s, when the investor base was dominated by leveraged 
investors and short-term traders. 
Latin American and Caribbean debt has come full circle since 
the 1982 debt crisis. Continuing the pattern of novelties of the past few 
years, there were several firsts in debt markets in 2012, such as the first 
wind energy project bonds, the first covered bond (a security backed by 
a separate group of assets), the second-ever issuance from a Paraguayan 
borrower, The Plurinational States of Bolivia’s first foray into international 
bond markets since the 1920s to reintegrate itself into the international 
financial community, and the first issuances in Chinese offshore renmimbi 
and Australian dollars. These events highlight the significant evolution of 
the region’s access to international bond markets in the past three decades.
From 1982 to 2012, countries in the region have moved from concerns 
about a shortage of funds towards how to best manage available financing 
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options. The increased access to private capital markets has provided many 
countries in the region with more funding options, considerably changing 
the landscape for development financing. Regional development banks such 
as Brazil’s BNDES, the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), and the 
Latin American Reserves Fund (FLAR), have also played an important role 
as suppliers of financing. Multilateral development finance, on the other 
hand, now has a smaller share in global financial flows to the region than 
in the recent past, although multilaterals still have a valuable role to play 
as providers of counter-cyclical funds.
Developments since the debt crisis have been remarkable. However, 
there is a high degree of heterogeneity among countries. Access to international 
bond markets is not universal, being more limited and costly for some 
countries than for others. This is the case for many Caribbean countries, 
given the unique constraints they face in attracting global capital because 
of their vulnerability to economic shocks and their small size. Financing 
from multilateral sources continues to be crucial.
Despite the region’s increased resilience, vulnerability to external 
financial shocks can still be a threat. The current low interest rates are 
unprecedented, and as long as liquidity remains abundant, Latin American 
bond markets will continue to be an attractive place for fixed-income investors. 
However, the prospect of higher United States interest rates and Treasury 
yields with the end of quantitative easing is a concern for many buyers of 
Latin American bonds, as the withdrawal of liquidity is likely to uncover 
vulnerabilities that have persisted in the region. The end of quantitative 
easing will almost certainly slow the flow of money into the region, but how 
much of an impact this will have on local bond markets is hard to gauge. 
Another concern is the end of the cycle of ever-rising commodity 
prices. In recent years, wagering that rising demand from China would 
continue to drive up prices for industrial commodities, investors poured 
money indiscriminately into companies in the energy and raw materials 
sectors. However, as demand from China slows, investors have already 
started to discrimate more and to focus on profitability, while money is 
beginning to shift from commodities to other sectors, such as technology. 
 In a changing external environment, it is safe to assume that investors 
will become more careful and discriminating, and will thus tend to differentiate 
more as well. Countries may need to focus on structural overhaul in order to 
be viewed as safer long-term bets. Corporate and sovereign issuers have taken 
advantage of the unprecedented demand in international capital markets, 
but caution must be exercised for a sudden change in the global backdrop.
Finally, following the past decade of growth, some of the competitive 
advantages of Latin American markets relative to developed markets have 
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started to erode. Financial valuations appear to be converging in emerging 
and developed markets, and domestic emerging market currencies seem 
less competitive than they used to be, which could reduce the diversification 
benefits of allocating to emerging markets. In this new context, investors 
may need to balance both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors when 
looking for investment prospects. This marks a new stage for the region in its 
long journey towards increased access to international debt markets: while 
remaining watchful of macroeconomic and policy risks, new investment 
opportunities will increasingly be found at the sector or industry level.
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This publication examines how external debt financing has evolved in 
the past three decades (1982-2012). It looks back 30 years and analyses 
the Latin American and Caribbean region’s trajectory from the unique 
perspective of access to international financial markets. As the title 
implies, this trajectory has been a rollercoaster ride, with many ups and 
downs, and moments of anticipation and panic. 
The developments of the past three decades as described in this book 
suggest that more widespread and cheaper access to international capital 
markets can play a role in the long process of achieving sustainable 
growth with equality, by broadening the options for financing investment 
and social initiatives. 
Despite the lessons learned and the progress over this period, many 
challenges remain. Access to external debt financing is not universal and, 
despite increased resilience, vulnerability to external financial shocks can 
still be a threat. Moreover, the financial and economic advances of the 
past 30 years, and particularly of the past decade, have not brought about 
changes in the region’s production structure. Structural change should be 
at the heart of a long-term growth process to make equality a reality.
Imagen abstracta que 
sugiere alzas y bajas 
a modo de montaña 
rusa y a la vez gráfico 
de mercado en un 
contexto complejo y 
variable.
